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INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the use of tax incentives by state and local 
governments to attract film and television production to their respective 
jurisdictions.  Traditionally, the term “runaway production” is used to 
describe this phenomenon, which is typically framed as a negative force by 
national and local media.  This begs the question:  What is “runaway 
production?” 
While definitions of runaway production vary, the following offers a 
sufficient description:  “Runaway production refers to films that were 
conceptually developed in the United States, but filmed somewhere else.  If 
the conversation is at the federal level, runaway production goes to other 
countries.  If at the state level, production that goes to other states is 
runaway.”
1
  In general, there are three different categories of runaway 
productions—(1) artificial economic runaways, (2) natural economic 
runaways, and (3) artistic runaways: 
Artificial economic runaways are films shot abroad because of 
artificial, or legislatively created, incentives designed to lure 
productions.  Natural economic runaways are films that shoot 
abroad to take advantage of natural economic occurring 
phenomenon—cheap labor—that lower production costs.  
Artistic runaways are films that shoot abroad to artistically 
service the story—a film about Paris that shoots in Paris.
2
 
 
 1. MARTHA JONES, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION IN 
CALIFORNIA 2 (2002).  Runaway films can be “creative runaways” or “economic runaways.”  
Id. at 35.  Most industry insiders, however, will readily admit that the vast majority of 
runaways are for economic reasons. 
 2. Adrian McDonald, Through the Looking Glass: Runaway Productions and 
“Hollywood Economics,” 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 879, 900 (2007). 
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Scope of Article 
This Article is divided into eight parts.  Part I provides an overview of 
the runaway production problem, which has been an increasing threat ever 
since Canada enacted generous film incentives in the late 1990s, which 
were quickly copied around the world and, regrettably, in over forty U.S. 
states.  Film incentives were conceived as weapons to cause runaway 
production and, for the present, the only means of defense the U.S. has 
available to fight back.  However, the weapon is not currently employed to 
protect the nation, but it is being used by states to fight each other.  Rather 
than fighting back with the global competition, the U.S. is effectively 
shooting itself in the face.  Despite the catastrophic misapplication of the 
weapon, the cumulative effect of film incentives gave the nation a de facto 
national incentive allowing evidence of their effectiveness as a workable 
solution to runaway production to emerge based on their effect on 
production spending and employment in Canada. 
Part II explores the economic impact of the motion picture industry in 
the U.S. and the fundamental importance of the industry to the U.S. 
economy.  Much of the focus concerns film and television employment 
statistics, which should be paramount in the minds of national policy 
makers in the current economic environment. 
Part III is an overview of how runaway production is being studied by 
the academic community and offers an overview of the academic discourse 
on the topic, which has been virtually ignored in the legal and public policy 
literature.  Part III also provides a brief discussion of the historical role 
runaway production has played in Hollywood, and how the issue has been 
framed in the past and present by those in the entertainment industry.  Part 
III then concludes with an examination of the recent efforts to combat 
runaway production and the methods for dealing with it.  In 2006, there 
were two main policy options to fight runaway production:  (1) trade 
action(s) to challenge the legality of film subsidies under international trade 
agreements, and (2) the use of “incentive to fight incentive” or “subsidy to 
fight subsidy” approach.  Now there is only the latter, as trade remedies by 
the U.S. have been ruled out.  The history of the ill-fated trade action filing 
in the U.S. is also discussed. 
Part IV contains a thorough overview of film incentives and how they 
are employed across the United States.  A brief history of the rapid 
proliferation of film incentives across the U.S. and a discussion regarding 
the efficacy of film incentives in luring productions to new jurisdictions is 
provided.  Part IV also contains an examination of the claims and 
arguments made by film incentive skeptics/opponents regarding the role 
film incentives play in location decisions for productions. 
Part V examines the debate over film incentives, primarily from a cost 
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versus benefit perspective.  A discussion of the increasingly hostile, if not 
disgraceful, rhetoric and tactics film incentive proponents (film backers) 
employ to discredit critics and skeptics of film incentive programs is also 
included.  The concerns of film incentive critics, as time has gone on, have 
proven to be justified.  Sadly, despite the claims of their “return on 
investment,” film incentives are often a monumental waste of scarce public 
resources that cost states billions of dollars at a time when all states 
offering film incentives face budget shortfalls. 
Part VI takes a detailed look at the impact film incentives in other 
states and nations have had on California.  The importance of the industry 
to the state and its economic impact is discussed in detail.  California’s 
response to runaway production, which consists of the California Film & 
Television Tax Credit, public education campaigns, and grassroots efforts, 
is examined and its effectiveness is evaluated in detail. 
Part VII examines the collective impact of the state film incentives on 
Canada, which, in recent decades, has pioneered the use of significant film 
incentives to attract runaway productions from the U.S. in an ongoing 
attempt to lure the relocation of a major U.S. industry with remarkable—if 
not frightening—success.  However, while film incentives have been used 
as a weapon to cause runaway production, there is now evidence showing 
they can be used as a defense as well. 
Finally, Part VIII summarizes the issues raised and problems 
presented in this paper regarding the efficacy of film incentives.  Given the 
state of the motion picture industry, the conclusion of this paper is that the 
incentive schemes enacted in many states beginning in 2002 have helped 
stem, stop and reverse runaway productions from leaving the nation.  While 
this is an overall gain for the U.S. economy in terms of retained jobs, it has 
come at an astronomical and unsustainable cost.  Federal legislation could 
end the race to the bottom by replacing the competing state incentives with 
a single national incentive.  Such a national incentive would refocus the 
issue of runaway production as a national problem and allow the U.S. to 
compete more effectively in the global marketplace.  As such, Part VIII 
offers a look at some basic models such federal legislation could take.  
Using state incentives to combat a national problem, runaway production, 
is madness; using one national incentive to combat the same national 
problem is a rational, effective and, most of all, imperative action for the 
nation to take if it wants to stop further economic decline and a loss of 
influence on the global stage. 
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I.  THE MADNESS OF STATE FILM INCENTIVES: THE CAUSE OF 
RUNAWAY PRODUCTION IS ALSO A SOLUTION REQUIRING PROPER 
APPLICATION 
Just a few years ago, much of the runaway production discussion in 
news, academic and government sources concerned the negative effects of 
runaway production on locations whose economies relied heavily on film 
and television production (e.g., Los Angeles) and how runaway 
productions might be stemmed, if not prevented.  One of the primary policy 
options discussed in such sources to stop runaway production was the 
enactment of competing production incentives on par with those offered in 
Canada and elsewhere; to fight fire with fire, so to speak.  As this article 
will show, production incentives do increase film and television production 
in locales where there had been little, if any, production before.  This so-
called solution to runaway production, however, is now being misused in 
the U.S. on a state level to weaken the strength of the movie industry at the 
national level. 
If production incentives are the primary factor causing film and 
television production to run away to Canada or elsewhere, then enacting a 
more attractive incentive would be sufficient in redirecting it from a 
competing location.  As more and more locations attempt to do the same, 
the classic race to the bottom ensues.  This is precisely what is happening 
now.  In 2006, there were relatively few U.S. states (Louisiana and New 
Mexico, for example, were the first) and international locations (Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, etc.) that offered competitive 
production incentives.  But as places like Louisiana and New Mexico got 
into the incentive game, other states watched with envy as Hollywood 
productions set up shop, which was incorrectly perceived as an economic 
boon that might be a source of new revenue for cash-strapped states.  
Having Hollywood “in town” is politically popular regardless of party 
affiliation—red and blue states alike are all on the bandwagon now. 
At the close of 2010, almost every U.S. state offered some level of 
significant production incentives in the hopes of becoming the next 
Hollywood North, Hollywood South . . . the “Hollywood anywhere.”
3
  
Sadly, many of these cash-starved states are beginning to realize that the 
perceived economic benefits of film incentives are, essentially, Hollywood 
special effects; they may look real, but they are an illusion. 
What should have been a national solution to runaway production, 
using a single film incentive to protect the potent concentration of the 
Hollywood industry cluster in Los Angeles (and, to a lesser extent, New 
 
 3. For a current list of domestic and international production incentives, visit the 
Entertainment Partners Incentive Group website at: http://www.entertainmentpartners.com/ 
Content/ProductionIncentives/Jurisdictions/US.aspx (last visited Dec. 11, 2011). 
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York), was bastardized into a state level tool that serves self-interested 
short-term “benefits” to individual states.  In the short term, jobs remained 
in the U.S. as opposed to going to Canada, but this was achieved by selfish, 
outrageously expensive and unsustainable policies that served to hurt not 
only the cash-strapped states enacting them, but also the entire nation.  The 
race to the bottom of U.S. states enacting film incentives has been a costly 
distraction from the threat runaway production poses from other nations.  
Film incentives are a weapon that the nation can use to defend itself.  But 
like any weapon, the nation needs to understand how to operate it.  With 
film incentives, the fundamentals are like that of a gun.  Instead of pointing 
the gun at the other nations causing runaway production, the U.S. has been 
shooting itself in the face. 
In addition to the problem of states fighting each other rather than 
responding to threats on an international level, convincing critics that a 
national film incentive is needed will prove difficult.  While production 
incentives can be employed to combat the effects of runaway production, 
they also have the effect of causing runaway production in other locations.  
One of the common arguments against the use of film incentives in the 
U.S., at least at the state level, is that taxpayers are subsidizing an 
economic activity that would have taken place anyways, even in the 
absence of film incentives.  Hollywood, after all, will continue to make 
movies. 
While this argument has a logical appeal, it is fatally flawed for a 
number of reasons.  First, in places where there is no film industry or very 
little production activity the argument that activity would have taken place 
there anyways is simply not true.  For example, in 2002, the year before 
Louisiana enacted its first incentive, production spending was just $3.5 
million.  In 2010, after nearly a decade with an increasingly generous film 
incentive, production spending in Louisiana soared to just over $674 
million, representing an almost incomprehensibly enormous increase.  
Thus, at the state level in Louisiana, the argument that the film incentive is 
rewarding economic activity that would have taken place anyways is 
patently false. 
Indeed, the argument that film incentives reward economic activity 
that would have occurred anyways is only valid in hypothetical scenarios.  
If the U.S. economy existed in a vacuum detached from the global 
economy and no states offered film incentives, the economic activity from 
film and television would still take place; it would occur almost exclusively 
in California and New York.  In such a vacuum, it would be a waste of 
money for the nation to reward economic activity already benefiting the 
nation—and even more wasteful for California or New York to do so alone.  
Taking this logic to the global economy, but for significant film incentives 
designed specifically to decimate and relocate Hollywood abroad, most 
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film and television production would occur in the U.S. 
But this hypothetical argument rests on an assumption that has no 
basis in reality.  Film incentives exist.  They are a weapon being used to 
wage economic warfare against the U.S.  Film incentives, like any weapon 
of war, were designed to cause maximum damage to the intended target.  
For example, Canadian-designed film incentives cause runaway production 
by attempting to erode the comparative advantages the U.S. has from its 
concentrated industry clusters in California and New York.  These clusters 
are the key to the U.S. film industry’s global dominance, and policymakers 
in the U.S. seem completely oblivious to this monumentally important fact. 
If the United States has a national interest in preventing runaway 
production to foreign nations, then having all fifty states competing with 
each other is not only counterproductive, but it is financially devastating to 
numerous state governments unable to sustain the huge amount of funds 
needed to pay for production incentives.  Any hope that film and television 
production will remain in states with no history in the industry once the 
production incentives cease is wishful thinking.  If the industry cluster in 
Los Angeles remains viable in the short-term, ending incentives in U.S. 
states outside of California and New York should result in a return of some 
to those two traditional locations. 
A more likely result is that productions will, in the absence of 
domestic film incentives, flock in alarming numbers to locations abroad.  
Just dealing with Canada and its film incentives was damaging to the 
United States.  Now, however, the nation faces a new host of opponents 
who have imitated the Canadian model of attack at the same breakneck 
speed at which it was adopted in almost every U.S. state.  The race to the 
bottom, certainly in the United States, must end.  It should be a concern for 
other nations, not this one.  With a national incentive combined with the 
advantage we already have from the industry cluster in Los Angeles, the 
U.S. would not have to compete in a race to the bottom.  In waging 
economic warfare—and military warfare alike—it is much easier to defend 
than it is to attack.  For each dollar the U.S. spent on protecting the film 
industry, the competition would need to match it with thousands more.  The 
international race to the bottom may prove too costly and the gains, if any, 
insignificant enough to sustain an industry without the steady stream of 
productions that require government spending to attract. 
All of this begs the question:  What is everyone fighting so fiercely 
for, and is it worth fighting for? 
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II.  WORTH FIGHTING FOR: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MOTION 
PICTURE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Since 2007, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) has 
released two reports on the economic impact of the motion picture and 
television production industry on the United States.
4
  Table 1 provides the 
“report highlights” for each. 
TABLE 1: 
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MPAA’S 2006 AND 2009 ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORTS
5
 
2005 2007 
1.3 million jobs 2.5 million jobs 
$73,000  $74,700 
$30.24 billion paid out as wages $41.1 billion paid out as wages 
$30.2 billion in revenue to U.S. vendors and 
suppliers 
$38.2 billion in payments to U.S. vendors and 
suppliers, small businesses and entrepreneurs 
$10 billion in income and sales taxes $13 billion in income and sales taxes 
$9.5 billion in trade surplus $13.6 billion in trade surplus 
 
The statistics from the reports are impressive, if assumed accurate.  
From 2000 to 2005, motion pictures as audiovisual exports increased by 
20%.
6
  Indeed, the motion picture industry “is one of the few industries that 
consistently generates a positive balance of trade.”
7
  The $9.5 billion trade 
surplus in 2005 was “larger than the combined positive trade balance for 
telecommunications and computer and information services, and was 12% 
of the entire U.S. private-sector service trade surplus.”
8
  In 2007, the 
industry trade surplus, at $15 billion in audiovisual exports, was the highest 
on record since tracking began in 1992—and 23% higher than in 2006.
9
 
The confusion, reliability and complexity of employment statistics in 
the motion picture industry were discussed and analyzed at length in 
2007.
10
  Since 2007, employment numbers are somewhat more consistent.  
 
 4. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION PRODUCTION 
INDUSTRY ON THE UNITED STATES (2009) [hereinafter 2009 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT 
REPORT]; MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AMERICA, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MOTION 
PICTURE & TELEVISION PRODUCTION INDUSTRY ON THE UNITED STATES (2006) [hereinafter 
2006 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT]; MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AMERICA. The 2006 
Report is based on data for 2005; the 2009 report is based on data from 2007. 
 5. 2006 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 5; 2009 MPAA ECONOMIC 
IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. 
 6. 2006 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 10. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. 2009 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. 
 10. McDonald, supra note 2, at 913–15. 
MCDONALD_FINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE)   
92 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
Table 2 shows the employment data from the MPAA’s 2006 and 2009 
Economic Impact Reports, which studied job numbers for 2005 and 2007 
respectively.
11
 
TABLE 2:  
FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION EMPLOYMENT, 2005 AND 2007  
2005 2007 
Core
12
 180,000  Core
13
 285,000 
Freelance
14
 231,000  Distribution
15
 478,000 
Indirect 1,000,000  Indirect 1,700,000 
Total  1,411,000 Total 2,463,000 
 
When the “indirect” job numbers are removed for each year, the 
remaining number of “direct” jobs is 411,000 in 2005 and 763,000 in 2007.  
The exact number of the multiplier was not supplied in the MPAA reports, 
but the U.S. Commerce Department reported that the highest multiplier 
used in such reports was 3.71 and the lowest was 1.79.
16
 
The numbers in the MPAA’s two economic impact reports also 
 
 11. 2009 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 6; 2006 MPAA ECONOMIC 
IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
 12. 2006 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. “Over 180,000 people 
were directly employed as studio, independent production company, or core industry 
supplier staff.  Core industry suppliers include film labs, special effects and digital studios, 
location services, prop and wardrobe houses, research services and film stock houses, video 
duplicating services and stage rental facilities among others.”  Id. 
 13. 2009 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
Over 285,000 people are employed in the core business of producing, 
marketing, manufacturing and distributing motion pictures and television 
shows, including full, part time and freelance workers at major studios, 
independent production companies, and core industry suppliers like film labs, 
special effects and digital studios, location services, and prop and wardrobe 
houses dedicated to the production industry, among others. The industry 
employs workers in every major occupational group, including actors, 
accountants, agents, animators, camera operators, casting directors, computer 
specialists, directors, editors, engineers, graphic designers, marketers, 
producers, special effects, technicians, writers, and many, many more.   
Id. 
 14. 2006 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.  Freelance workers 
“include actors, directors, writers,” and technical or craft specialists.  Id. at 6.  “While 
freelance employees account for more than half of the industry’s workforce, it’s important 
to note that freelance is not synonymous with ‘part-time’ as many work full time.”  Id. at 25. 
 15. 2009 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.  “This includes workers 
at movie theaters, video rental operations, television broadcasters, cable companies, and 
new dedicated online ventures like Hulu and TV.com.”  Id. 
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE MIGRATION OF U.S. FILMS AND TELEVISION 
PRODUCTION 23 (2001). 
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conflict with the employment numbers reported in the Association’s annual 
Market Statistics Reports.  However, the annual market reports only supply 
raw employment numbers from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
and do not account for multipliers or indirect impacts, etc.  According to 
the most recent market statistic report, the total number of jobs in the 
motion picture industry for 2006 was 354,400; in 2007, the total was 
357,300.
17
  Chart 1 shows the difference between data reported in the 
MPAA annual market statistic reports, which list only BLS data (NAICS 
5121), and the economic reports.  When the MPAA applied an economic 
multiplier to the data in its 2009 Economic Impact Report, and indirect 
employment is factored into overall employment, the number of industry 
supported jobs spiked. 
 
CHART 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the absence of any other source of consistent annual employment 
data, the BLS numbers are the de facto authority for the number of people 
“directly” employed by the motion picture industry. 
Chart 2
18
 shows the number of direct jobs in the motion picture 
 
 17. MOTION PICTURE INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY MARKET 
STATISTICS 2007 23 (2008) [hereinafter ENTERTAINMENT MARKET STATISTICS 2007]. 
 18. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR, QUARTERLY CENSUS OF EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 2001–
2010 (2010) [hereinafter BLS DATA], http://www.bls.gov/data/ (follow “Employment” 
hyperlink; then click “one screen data search” button next to “State and County 
Employment and Wages (Quarterly)”; then search “U.S. Total” for 1, “U.S. Total” for 2, 
“NAICS 5121 Motion picture and video industries” for 3, “Private” for 4, “All 
establishment sizes” for 5, “All Employees” for 6; then click on the “Get Data” button); 
MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AMERICA, WORLDWIDE MARKET RESEARCH, U.S. 
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY: 2004 MPA MARKET STATISTICS 27 (2004); ENTERTAINMENT 
MARKET STATISTICS 2007, supra note 17, at 23. 
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industry from 1995 through May 2009 according to the BLS Current 
Employment Statistics (CES), which is the same data that the MPAA uses 
in its annual reports. 
 
CHART 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The employment data from the CES, however, is not perfectly consistent 
with the data from the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW), which is generally several thousand jobs less than the CES, as 
seen in Chart 3.
19
 
 
CHART 3: 
 
 
 19. BLS DATA, supra note 18. 
U.S. Motion Picture Employment (NAICS 5121) 2001-2008 
From QCEW
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As CES data (Chart 2) shows, motion picture industry employment 
grew dramatically from 1995 (283,700) to its peak in 2004 (363,300).  In 
2005, total employment fell to 357,200 and fell again in 2006 to 354,400.  
Since 2006, total employment increased each year and, as of July 2009, 
was at 372,300.
20
 
The dramatic increase in industry employment was also tracked 
closely by Allen J. Scott’s survey of employment from January 1983 until 
December 2002.
21
  Using SIC 78 (Standard Industrial Classification) to 
measure employment in Los Angeles County, Scott noted a large and 
steady increase in motion picture employment that peaked in 1998 and 
declined each year until 2002, which was the extent of available data.
22
  
Scott was unable offer a comprehensive explanation for the decline, but 
acknowledged runaway production probably played a part.
23
 
The BLS’s change from the old SIC classification to the current 
NAICS system is problematic.  For example, under the old SIC 78, motion 
picture employment was 408,000 in 1990 and jumped to 672,000 in 2010
24
, 
which is much higher than the NAICS data currently used.  Indeed, 
employment numbers are inherently confusing.  Yet, it is critical that 
industry observers, policy makers, and anyone involved in the motion 
picture industry have a rudimentary understanding of the employment 
statistics, imperfect as they may be. 
Without a doubt, the film industry’s economic importance to the 
entire nation is very clear.  But, as discussed in Part I, the benefit the 
industry confers to the nation stems from its overwhelming concentration 
in California.  In 2009, California’s share of the total number of people 
employed in the motion picture and video industries in the U.S. was 38.7% 
and 36% for the total number of independent artists, writers, and 
performers.
25
  In 2009, labor income for the motion picture and video 
industries and for independent artists, writers, and performers was $15.5 
billion and $7.7 billion, respectively (California’s share of national labor 
income for these categories was over 60%).
26
  The total economic output of 
the motion picture and video industry in California was a massive $48.5 
billion in 2009, representing 59.2% of the U.S. total.  That same year, 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. ALLEN J. SCOTT, ON HOLLYWOOD 123 (2005). 
 22. Id. at 122–23. 
 23. Id. at 122. 
 24. JONES, supra note 1, at 21. 
 25. L.A. CNTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., CALIFORNIA FILM AND TELEVISION TAX CREDIT 
PROGRAM:  AN ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 3 (2011) [hereinafter LAEDC ECONOMIC IMPACT 
STUDY]. 
 26. Id. 
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independent artists, writers, and performers generated $14.3 billion in 
California, representing 59% of the U.S. total.
27
 
In 2011, the Los Angeles County Economic Development 
Corporation (LAEDC) highlighted California’s unique position within the 
industry, noting how 92% of all purchases the industry makes are sourced 
within California: 
California’s rich history in film making has allowed the 
development of a deep pool of talented workers in the variety of 
occupations needed to produce a motion picture or television 
series.  This makes it possible for the industry to find suppliers 
for almost all its needs within the state, keeping this economic 
activity here.  Almost 92 percent of all the goods and services 
purchased by the industry are sourced within the state. . . . 
The industry purchased $6.4 billion in goods and services 
from other firms within its own industry; it purchased $1.7 
billion in advertising services and paid $1.5 billion in rent or real 
estate services.  In aggregate, the industry spent $15.4 billion on 
goods and services in California in 2009 from a wide variety of 
industries.
28
 
The $15.4 billion in spending, while impressive, is smaller than in 
the past.  In 1996, for example, the year before Canada developed its first 
significant film incentives, production spending in California was $15.5 
billion, $20.98 in 2009 dollars.
29
  The concentrated industry in California 
was critical in preventing any other nation from cracking Hollywood’s 
global dominance.  Seemingly unaware that California’s film industry 
cluster gives the U.S. film industry its strength, lawmakers in the U.S. have 
failed to appreciate that foreign nations would target filmmaking; their 
ignorance meant California’s production dominance was completely 
undefended and ripe for attack. 
Unlike in the U.S., policymakers in other nations, particularly 
Canada, are keenly aware of the importance of such concentrations: 
In business, as elsewhere in life, Darwin’s rules apply.  The 
first group to establish itself in a market generally attains an 
insurmountable height from which to hold down competitors. 
The governments of Canada, Ontario and Toronto recognized 
many years ago that to build a Canadian screen-based industry, 
public funds had to flow.  Only the public could afford the risks 
of entry into the well established screen business. 
Hollywood got into the screen business in the 1920s and 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. JONES, supra note 1, at 11. 
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established its hegemony with massive investments in 
infrastructure and talent in Los Angeles, at a time and in a place 
where more days per year of reliable sunshine was a business 
advantage for a technology that needed available light. 
Studios like RKO and MGM built film versions of old theatre 
repertory companies which they staffed with directors, actors, 
writers and crews.  They put out their products through 
worldwide distribution networks.
30
 
Recognizing that Hollywood’s established hegemony developed and 
preserves because it concentrated in one place (Los Angeles), policymakers 
in Toronto understood the importance of creating their own concentrated 
industry cluster and warned that policies which encouraged production in 
other parts of the nation not only hurt Toronto, Canada’s leading 
production center, but threatened the viability of the industry in the entire 
nation: 
But some industries, particularly screen arts, don’t lend 
themselves to being spread thin.  In fact, they grow best in big 
Creative Cities where talent is concentrated, and there is a 
sustaining supply of work. 
Screen arts, like other art forms, are only mastered by doing.  
They require a sophisticated infrastructure, including state-of-
the-art studios, post production facilities, and schools that train 
sufficient newcomers to supply the business as it grows.  But 
screen arts infrastructure is expensive, and can best be afforded 
where capital costs can be amortized through constant use. . . . 
Instead of supporting Toronto as a world-class centre of 
excellence, policies have begun to tear it down.  If Toronto fails, 
the viability of the industry across the country will suffer.
31
 
The same warning expressed above applies in this nation.  The 
concentration of the film and television industries in Los Angeles is the 
main reason Hollywood enjoys unrivaled global dominance.  No one 
anywhere else has been able to compete.  The world-class concentration of 
talent and infrastructure in Los Angeles cannot sustain itself without a 
constant level of movie and television production.  Runaway production to 
other nations is a national concern because it weakens this concentration, 
which is the one thing that makes Hollywood such a global juggernaut. 
A national solution is needed to protect the national advantage the 
U.S. enjoys from the concentrated industry cluster in Los Angeles (and, to 
a lesser extent, New York).  The industry cluster in Los Angeles needs a 
 
 30. TORONTO FILM BD., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR TORONTO’S SCREEN-BASED INDUSTRY 14 
(2007). 
 31. Id. at 24–25. 
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constant level of movie and television production to survive.  A film 
incentive in the U.S. at the national level could solve this problem, and it 
may be the only possible solution.  State film incentives are ineffective 
solutions to runaway production because they exacerbate the erosion of the 
industry cluster in Los Angeles, further weakening the one part of the 
industry that makes the U.S. so dominant around the world. 
III.  RUNAWAY PRODUCTION AS “SCENE” FROM ACADEMIC SOURCES AND 
FROM THOSE IN HOLLYWOOD 
For some time, a growing number of academic sources have taken a 
more sophisticated approach to examining runaway production, which was 
traditionally seen as a local concern in the United States, limited to Los 
Angeles.  According to Ben Goldsmith, head of the Center for Screen 
Studies and Research at the Australian Film Television and Radio School 
in Sydney, and Tom O’Regan, of the University of Queensland in 
Australia, runaway production opponents tend to: 
[I]gnore or downplay both the benefits that international 
production brings to American cinema and the variety of 
perspectives on, motivations for, and experiences of international 
collaboration outside the United States.  International production 
enriches American cinema through artistic achievement, creative 
renewal, and access to sources of production funding, as well as 
through financial returns and intellectual property rights.
32
 
The relatively new, more sophisticated approach to studying film 
and television production in a globalized age caused some academics to 
deem the concept of runaway production “cross border cultural 
production.”
33
  Greg Elmer and Mike Gasher provide an explanation in a 
shift towards greater scholarly reflection: 
While location shooting is as old as cinema itself, the sheer size, 
the growing intensity, and the persistence of the trend toward 
moving American film and television production out of 
Hollywood calls for much more scholarly reflection than we have 
seen to date and for analysis that includes perspectives of host 
sites.  For one thing, location production is not as simple a 
phenomenon as most news reportage and some academic work 
suggests; understanding it requires consideration, at the macro 
scale, of economic globalization, screen aesthetics, narrative 
 
 32. Ben Goldsmith & Tom O’Regan, International Film Production: Interests and 
Motivations, in CROSS BORDER CULTURAL PRODUCTION: ECONOMIC RUNAWAY OR 
GLOBALIZATION? 13, 15 (Janet Wasko & Mary Erikson eds., 2009) (citation omitted). 
 33. See generally CROSS BORDER CULTURAL PRODUCTION: ECONOMIC RUNAWAY OR 
GLOBALIZATION? (Janet Wasko & Mary Erikson eds., 2009) (examining the cross-cultural 
benefits that come from international production and collaboration). 
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forms, and reception practices, as well as, at the micro scale, 
specific production communities, individual films and television 
programs, and particular audiences. . . . [T]he transformation of 
Hollywood from an exclusive and centralized base to a global 
network of production sites . . . alters in some fundamental ways 
the political economy of the commercial film industry. . . . 
[L]ocation film and television production does not mean the same 
thing to all industry actors, and therefore must be analyzed from 
a variety of viewpoints.
34
 
Cross border cultural production, the reality of what international 
production entails, is a highly complex international economic and cultural 
field of study.  According to Goldsmith and O’Regan: 
International production connects film industries in different 
countries, and in the process it can introduce or create new work 
practices.  Individuals, organizations, and places employed or 
transformed by the experience of international production, as 
well as the ever increasing number of employees working to 
facilitate international production in particular places, often do 
not wholly share the interests or production norms of American 
production companies or transnational media corporations.  They 
are, however, not only becoming increasingly interconnected and 
simultaneously integrated, informally and formally, into 
Hollywood’s globalizing production system, but also becoming 
more integrated into each other’s national production systems 
through coproductions and other cooperative arrangements.
35
 
Clearly, reframing and expanding the study of film policy and 
runaway production to acknowledge the complexity of runaway production 
is long overdue.  While academics have done an excellent job in elevating 
the discussion about runaway production, there remain some flaws in the 
academic arguments. 
Few works of academic literature discuss the risks governments 
face in attempting to foster a local film and television production industry 
through film and television production incentives.
36
  Virtually no literature 
criticizes the current incentive schemes as problematic or potentially 
devastating economic policy.
37
  One possible explanation is that not 
 
 34. Greg Elmer & Mike Gasher, Introduction: Catching Up to Runaway Productions, 
in CONTRACTING OUT HOLLYWOOD 1, 2 (Greg Elmer & Mike Gasher, eds., 2005). 
 35. Goldsmith & O’Regan, International Film Production: Interests and Motivations, 
supra note 32, at 15. 
 36. See generally BEN GOLDSMITH & TOM O’REGAN, THE FILM STUDIO: FILM 
PRODUCTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005) (discussing the contemporary international 
film environment) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH & O’REGAN, THE FILM STUDIO]. 
 37. Janet Wasko, to her credit, recognized such a problem in film and media study from 
a “media economics” approach:  “These approaches avoid any kind of moral grounding, as 
most studies emphasize description (or ‘what is’) rather than critique (or ‘what ought to 
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everyone in the academic community believes there is, in Janet Wasko’s 
words, a “runaway production problem.”
38
 
Goldsmith and O’Regan argue that international production “both 
privilege[s] and expand[s] the Hollywood design interest,” and view the 
growth of international and domestic production locations like Toronto, 
Canada and Wilmington, North Carolina as a positive development for Los 
Angeles’s design and production industries.
39
  Conversely, Cornell 
University’s Susan Christopherson is less optimistic in appraising the 
dispersion of production to international locations, specifically Vancouver, 
Canada: 
Several conclusions emerge out of the Canadian story.  First, 
although subsidies and exchange rates increased the propensity of 
U.S. producers to use Canadian regions to reduce costs in 
particular types of productions, they did not build a sustainable 
industry in the key region in which the subsidy strategy was 
deployed, Vancouver.  Second, the changing organization of 
production in the media entertainment industries allowed TNCs 
to utilize the investments that Canadian citizens made in 
developing regional production bases over a period of 50 years.  
Finally, the evidence from the Canadian “success story” suggests 
that interregional competition has increased the profits of 
transnational firms rather than building competitive regional 
industries.
40
 
Christopherson appropriately recognizes the danger of 
interregional competition.  However, she underestimates the role 
production incentives play in selecting where to make a movie: 
This trajectory of Canadian success is contestable on a number of 
fronts.  First, it ignores the impact of the exchange rate 
differential.  The value of the Canadian dollar lagged the U.S. 
dollar throughout the 1990s and made the cost of producing in 
Canada relatively less expensive in the United States.  The cost 
savings did not occur across all categories of production 
expenditures, however.  Only the cost of the “below-the-line” 
production crew is identified as susceptible to cost savings 
because of the exchange rate.  Outsourcing does not emerge in 
conjunction with subsidies.  In addition to and substantiating the 
weak link between outsourcing and subsidies, a recent 
 
be’).”  JANET WASKO, HOW HOLLYWOOD WORKS 6 (2003). 
 38. Id. at 219. 
 39. GOLDSMITH & O’REGAN, THE FILM STUDIO,  supra note 36, at 178. 
 40. Susan Christopherson, Behind the Scenes: How Transnational Firms Are 
Constructing a New International Division of Labor in Media Work, in CROSS BORDER 
CULTURAL PRODUCTION: ECONOMIC RUNAWAY OR GLOBALIZATION? 47, 74 (Janet Wasko & 
Mary Erikson eds., 2009). 
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econometric analysis of the impact of subsidies in British 
Columbia shows only a weak relationship between tax credits 
and production spending levels.
41
 
The notion that the exchange rate is as big a factor in influencing 
production as tax incentives is tenuous at best.
42
  Moreover, the correlation 
between production incentives and increased production spending is not as 
weak as Christopherson suggests, given the production data now available 
from jurisdictions with recently enacted incentives, which is discussed in 
Part II herein.
43
 
A.  Framing Runaway Production: Part of Hollywood History or 
National Problem? 
Runaway production has a long history in Hollywood.  In 1956, for 
example, 18 of 39 films then in production shot on location in Europe, 
Japan, Cuba and four states other than California, according to the 
Hollywood Reporter, while “dozens of Hollywood soundstages were 
dark.”
44
  Films shot abroad in the 1950s faced difficulties including 
“language barriers, cultural divides, varying regulations and fees, 
inadequate facilities and services, and inexperienced (or uncooperative) 
crews.”
45
  These “difficulties,” according to the Hollywood Reporter, were 
“much the same as they are today, as was the controversy.”
46
 
In 1952, the Hollywood Film Council of the American Federation 
of Labor launched a public relations campaign to end the practice of 
 
 41. Id. at 70. 
 42. See McDonald, supra note 2, at 905–06 (discussing the role exchange rates play in 
influencing production decisions). 
 43. To Christopherson’s credit, her recent work (written with Ned Rightor) addresses 
the value of production incentives in places that traditionally lacked film and television 
production: 
As subsidies to film and television producers have spread (43 states across the 
U.S. now offer them in some form) and state budgets have come under 
increasing pressure, questions are being raised about the use of public tax 
money to lure media producers.  Skeptics ask whether the cost of attracting 
media producers is worth it.  Does the state’s economy benefit enough to 
warrant taking money from other important activities, such as education or 
infrastructure or the arts?  Can new, sustainable industries really be built in 
cities and states that have no history of media industry investment nor a sizable 
skilled production workforce. 
Susan Christopherson & Ned Rightor, The Creative Economy as “Big Business” 1 (Apr. 12, 
2009) (unpublished summary of larger study published in 2009) (on file with author). 
 44. Todd Longwell, Runaway Production Part of Industry History, HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Oct. 29, 2008, 9:19 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/runaway-
production-part-industry-history-121999. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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runaway production.
47
  The union did not oppose runaway production 
necessitated by artistic concerns, but sought to “stop the growing tendency 
here among Hollywood producers, especially in television, to do their 
shooting in foreign countries principally to cut costs.  Hollywood 
employment already has been considerably decreased by these activities.”
48
  
This too is much the same today. 
In 1959, Hollywood labor unions claimed between 35 and 50% of 
American feature films were shot abroad.
49
  Some producers grew tired of 
the complaints.  Producer Ted Richmond said, “The choice is simple.  
Either you make these spectacle pictures abroad or you don’t make them at 
all.”
50
  At the time, Richmond just completed shooting a film in Spain 
because of “the prohibitive cost of shooting in Hollywood.”
51
  Despite the 
campaign against runaway production, “[t]he protests did nothing to halt 
the exodus.”
52
  And despite “the exodus” of more runaway productions 
each year, “doomsday . . . never came” because “the local production 
economy continued to thrive.”
53
  And thrive it did.  From 1980 to 1997, 
motion picture and “service activities in Los Angeles County grew at a rate 
of 194% for employment and 248% for businesses.”
54
 
In recent years, a “loud chorus of complaints” has warned that 
Southern California’s unmatched film infrastructure is slowly eroding as 
production shifts to foreign nations.
55
  One sign of erosion is the number of 
shooting days in Los Angeles, which “decreased nearly 40% from 1997-
2007.”
56
  Given the long history of runaway production in Hollywood over 
the years, it is prudent to ask rhetorically:  “Is the sky really going to fall on 
Hollywood this time?”
57
 
According to director Richard Donner, who helmed such films as 
1978’s Superman and the Lethal Weapon franchise, the answer is no, “it 
won’t . . . [i]t’ll go and come and go and come and build and fall.  It’s been 
that way forever.”
58
  Donner’s words are not reassuring.  Donner shot much 
of the original Superman film in Canada and England.
59
  Donner was also a 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Filming Locations for Superman (1978), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0078346/locations (last visited May 18, 2009). 
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producer on the first X-Men film,
60
 which shot entirely in Canada,
61
 and an 
executive producer on 2009’s follow-up X-Men Origins: Wolverine, which 
shot primarily in Australia.
62
 
Shooting Wolverine in Australia was objectionable for some long-
time fans of the comic book character since Wolverine is, ironically, 
Canadian.  Bryan Singer, who directed the first two X-Men films, was 
conscious of the moral dilemma of shooting in Canada over the U.S.
63
  
While shooting X-Men, filming was briefly halted because “some crazy 
guy” driving to his home on the evening commute became angered over a 
long traffic delay caused by the production.
64
  The event prompted Singer’s 
associate, Brian Peck, to joke, “[i]t was probably a gripe from America 
upset at runaway production.  ‘Why are you taking all the work to 
Canada?’”
65
  Singer’s response showed he was uneasy about the shoot:  
“Normally I wouldn’t be so quick to shoot in another country, but much of 
the X-Men history and Wolverine’s history is steeped in Canada.  And so if 
we had to go out of the country to try to save money, Canada was the most 
responsible destination.”
66
 
Donner’s wife, Laura Shuler-Donner, was a producer on all of the 
Canadian-filmed X-Men films
67
 as well as the Wolverine film.
68
  Moreover, 
Shuler-Donner was also a producer on 2003’s Timeline, directed by her 
husband and filmed in Canada and the Czech Republic.
69
  Thus, Donner’s 
claim that the sky isn’t falling on the U.S. motion picture industry is 
suspect.  He is not a neutral observer of the runaway production 
phenomenon; rather, he is an active participant perpetuating it. 
Runaway production is good for the Donner family business, 
however, and the powerful Hollywood couple cannot be blamed for taking 
advantage of it.  Donner’s remark that “[runaway production has] been that 
 
 60. Richard Donner, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/name/ 
nm0001149/#producer (last visited May 18, 2009). 
 61. Filming Locations for X-Men (2000), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120903/locations (last visited May 18, 2009). 
 62. Richard Donner, supra note 60. 
 63. Bryan Singer, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/name/ 
nm0001741/ (last visited May 18, 2009). 
 64. Bryan Singer, Director’s Commentary at 15:50, X-MEN (20th Century Fox Film 
Corp. 2000). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Lauren Shuler Donner, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/ 
name/nm0795682/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).  The X-Men films include X-Men, X2: United, 
and X-Men: The Last Stand. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.; Filming Locations for Timeline (2003), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0300556/locations (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
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way forever” would have us believe that runaway production is an 
institutionalized part of the motion picture industry.
70
  Perhaps it is. 
Many of Donner’s films are artificial economic runaways.
71
  
Therefore, if economic runaways have always been part of the industry, it 
is because filmmakers like Donner go after them.  This is not to suggest 
that Donner should be criticized.  If anything, he is a shrewd filmmaker 
skillfully navigating the realities of film production.  Donner did not enact 
incentives; he just takes advantage of them. 
Not everyone in Hollywood shares Donner’s take on runaway 
production.  Director and Producer Michael Bay, well known for his flashy, 
big-budget summer blockbusters, including Transformers and 
Transformers 2: Revenge of the Fallen, has expressed solidarity with his 
film and television colleagues in California.  Bay claimed that he could not 
make Transformers in Canada because he only had faith in his experienced 
sixteen-year crew to make such a technical and special effects driven 
project, which was nothing short of spectacular in terms of visual effects.  
In order to stay “loyal” to his crew, Bay agreed to waive 30% of his fee to 
compensate for the alleged cost savings the studio sought from shooting in 
Canada or Australia: 
I do like to have a good environment on the set and especially 
work with people that look at it [their work on films] as a career, 
not as a job.  A director is only as good as his or her crew.  And 
the studio wanted to ship me off to Australia and then to Canada.  
I went to check out Canada and thought that Australia was too far 
away, and went up to Canada and I was like oh my god, I was 
trying to make it work, trying to make it work, looking around, 
scouting . . . I realized this would be a waste of money . . . there 
is no way the crew could do the serious kind of stunt work that 
we really do on our sets, because they just don’t have a lot of 
great stunt work up there and you have to ship in too many 
people and it just would be a lost cause.  So, the studio gave me 
some grief for not going up there, so I ended up giving 30% of 
my fee so I could shoot with my crew in America and that’s 
because I am loyal to my crew and they’re just, I think, the best.
72
 
Indeed, the importance of having a skilled crew base is a critical 
factor often overlooked in explaining runaway production.
73
  In Bay’s case, 
 
 70. Longwell, supra note 44, at 2. 
 71. Donner’s most recent production, X-Men Origins: Wolverine, is so plainly an 
economic runaway that any argument that creative or artistic reasons were behind shooting 
in Australia would be a total farce.  The artistic place to shoot would have been in Canada, 
as Wolverine is a Canadian and the vast majority of his story of origin took place entirely in 
Canada. 
 72. Michael Bay, Directory’s Commentary at 54:50, TRANSFORMERS (Paramount 
Pictures 2007). 
 73. Andrew Stanton, director of 2008’s Wall-E, echoed Bay’s words regarding the 
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the value of an experienced group of career industry workers trumped all 
financial considerations.  Had Bay filmed abroad, much of his long-time 
crew would have been left to find other projects, if available.  Over time, if 
experienced film crews sit idle, unable to find local work, the talent base 
will diminish along with the advantage of institutional “know-how” 
California film workers possess. 
The availability of an experienced talent base, which is highly 
compensated for its skills in places like Canada and the United States, does 
not always trump bottom-line concerns.  Director Paul W. S. Anderson 
discussed the economics of producing his 2003 film, Aliens vs. Predator: 
To talk about the economics of film . . . we budgeted this 
movie.  Just to build the sets, the construction budget, just for the 
sets alone, if we had done the sets in L.A., it would have cost 20 
million dollars; to do it in Vancouver, it was 15, to do it in Berlin 
it was 5 million and we built exactly the same sets in Prague for 
2 million dollars . . . . It’s one of the reasons the movie has a 
huge look, but we were able to do it on a contained budget. 
That was an important thing to the studio, because they were 
there kind of looking at the bottom line of what the last couple of 
Alien movies and the last Predator movie had done.  They had 
not been financial successes.
74
 
The low cost of labor in Prague for Anderson’s production was a factor that 
played a role in causing a natural economic runaway; the government did 
not take action to artificially lower labor costs. 
Donner’s statement about runaway production not being a serious 
issue signals a mentality that should be cause for concern if it is widely 
held.  Indeed, Donner’s feelings regarding the perpetuity of runaway 
production is indicative of a larger problem facing the motion picture 
industry:  complacency. 
The motion picture industry is a modern industry that did not exist 
just over one hundred years ago.  To attach the notion of “forever” to an 
 
critical advantage an experienced talent base brings to the table: 
I lucked out that they were at the top of their game.  A lot of these guys I have 
worked with have been fellow employees for over 10–15 years, some of them.  
And I just feel like they’ve just become Olympic level champions at whatever it 
is they do and to watch them do their job, see them excel at stuff they were 
struggling with or starting to do early in their career and just to be professionals, 
masters of their crafts, now, is really exciting.  And to benefit from that is the 
best. 
Andrew Stanton, Director’s Commentary, WALL-E (Walt Disney Pictures 2008). 
 74. Paul W.S. Anderson, Director’s Commentary at 45:00, ALIENS VS. PREDATOR (20th 
Century Fox Film Corporation 2004). 
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industry younger than some Americans creates a false impression that 
Hollywood has always been—and always will be—here.  This belief may 
stem from ignorance or arrogance or both.  Either way, millions of 
Americans, at one time, viewed the automobile industry, the steel industry, 
and others in the same false light.  There is nothing “forever” about the 
motion picture industry.  It can evaporate.  What Donner seems unaware of 
is that runaway production is a vehicle for such evaporation.  The only 
certainty in Hollywood is uncertainty. 
B.  Hollywood Labor Efforts to Combat Runaway Production in Recent 
Years: The Failure of the Film and Television Action Committee’s 
Section 301 Filing with The U.S. Trade Representative 
Industry workers have long been opposed to runaway production, 
considering it a form of outsourcing directly attacking their trades, crafts, 
jobs, and careers—or, more profoundly, their way of life.  Coalitions of 
industry workers trying to end the negative consequences of runaway 
productions have had two viable options to consider in combating runaway 
production:  (1) petitioning the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
to determine the legality of foreign film incentives; or (2) lobbying for film 
incentives at the state, local, and federal levels.  On September 4, 2007, a 
group called the Film and Television Action Committee (FTAC), a 
coalition composed of unions, municipalities and individuals whose 
livelihood and economic security depend on the film and television 
production industry, filed a petition with the USTR under Section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974.
75
  In its petition, FTAC argued that subsidies offered 
by Canada to lure production and filming of U.S.-produced television 
shows and motion pictures were “inconsistent with Canada’s obligations 
under the [World Trade Organization] Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.”
76
 
Less than two months later, on October 16, 2007, the two options 
for fighting runaway production were reduced to one when the USTR 
rejected FTAC’s petition and offered the following: 
As provided under USTR regulations, the petition was reviewed 
by an interagency committee of trade and economic experts.  
Based on a thorough review of the economic data, other facts, 
and legal arguments set out in the petition, the interagency 
committee unanimously recommended that the USTR not accept 
 
 75. See Press Release, Statement from Gretchen Hamel, Deputy Assistant USTR for 
Public and Media Affairs, regarding a Section 301 Petition on Canadian Film Subsidies, 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (Oct. 19, 2007), 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2007/october/statement-
gretchen-hamel-deputy-assistant (discussing receipt of petition and the USTR’s response). 
 76. Id. 
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the petition because a dispute based on the information and 
arguments set out in the petition would not be effective in 
addressing the Canadian subsidies.
77
 
In response to this author’s Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request 
for any and all documentation relating to FTAC’s petition, the USTR 
provided just four pages.  One page was the USTR press release.  Another 
page informed that four pages were withheld as privileged, and the final 
two pages were redacted heavily. 
On October 17, 2007, William Busis, Chair, Section 301 
Committee, sent a memorandum to then-USTR Ambassador Susan C. 
Schwab.  The memorandum section for “Interagency Views” was 
redacted.
78
  Without providing any more information, the memorandum 
advised Schwab to reject FTAC’s petition.
79
  A general background of 
Section 301 was provided, but the discussion section was redacted.  
Whatever merits the petition had, they were not enough to influence the 
USTR, which based its decision on the redacted deliberations of an 
intergovernmental committee.  Imperfect as that may be, the new reality 
was that the only viable option left to stop runaway production was to 
“fight subsidy with subsidy,” a position taken by former actor Charlton 
Heston and leaders of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) at a 1961 
Congressional Hearing regarding runaway production.
80
 
IV.  THE RISE OF STATE FILM INCENTIVES 
In 2002, Louisiana and New Mexico became the first states to 
enact film and television production incentives on par with the generous 
incentives offered in Canada since 1997.
81
  The success of the incentives in 
Louisiana and New Mexico in attracting production was astonishing.  
When the Motion Picture Association of America released a 2007 report on 
the economic impact of the motion picture and television industry in the 
United States, it came to as no surprise that Louisiana and New Mexico 
were both in the top ten “production states” for 2005.
82
 
Louisiana and New Mexico reaped tremendous benefits as first 
movers among U.S. states to offer film incentives, and they were able to 
establish robust film and television production activities in those states.  As 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Memorandum from William Busis, Chair, Section 301 Committee, to Susan C. 
Schwab, USTR Ambassador (Oct. 16, 2007) (on file with author). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Pamela Conley Ulich & Lance Simmens, Motion Picture Production: To Run or 
Stay Made in the U.S.A., 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 357, 360 (2001). 
 81. STEPHEN KATZ, THE GLOBAL SUCCESS OF PRODUCTION TAX INCENTIVES AND THE 
MIGRATION OF FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION FROM THE U.S. TO THE WORLD 34, 63–65 (2006). 
 82. 2006 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. 
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other states noticed the success New Mexico and Louisiana enjoyed, they 
began enacting their own film incentive programs, hoping to experience 
similar gains.  By August 2005, according to the Los Angeles Times, fifteen 
states had enacted film incentives.
83
  By the end of 2010, there were a total 
of forty-three states with film incentives.
84
 
A.  Film Incentives: 101 
As discussed earlier, runaway production has a long history in 
Hollywood, which is why the complacency of those like Richard Donner is 
more dangerous than ever before.  Although Hollywood has battled with 
runaway production before, the reasons why it happened in the past (cheap 
labor, exchange rates, etc.) are not the same as they are now.  Runaway 
production in the last ten to fifteen years is a much greater problem because 
of the large and widespread use of film incentives, which Robert 
Tannenwald calls “a new phenomenon”:
85
 
The proliferation of film credits is a new phenomenon.  Until 
2002 state film subsidies were limited in scope.  A few states 
offered film producers small credits against income taxes, 
deductions from taxable income for losses incurred in production, 
or loan guarantees.  Other subsidies were confined to the 
provision of public services at no cost (for example, police 
details, ready access to public lands, assistance in identifying 
locations, and expedited permitting), or exemption from sales tax 
on purchases of goods from local vendors and from hotel and 
lodging taxes for employees working on an in-state movie shoot.  
These subsidies may or may not have been the best possible use 
of funds, but they were low-cost and therefore relatively 
harmless.
86
 
The modern era film incentive can take many forms.  In February 
2009, Economic Research Associates (ERA) prepared a ninety-page report 
on entertainment industries in Louisiana for the Louisiana Economic 
Development Department.  The following table (Table 3) provides an 
overview of the types of film incentives commonly used in the United 
States according to ERA.
87
 
 
 83. Hollyworld, Runaway production map, L.A. TIMES, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-hollywoodmap-fl,0,6549427.flash. 
 84. ROBERT TANNENWALD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATE FILM 
SUBSIDIES: NOT MUCH BANG FOR TOO MANY BUCKS 1 (2010). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 3. 
 87. ECONOMICS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND 
RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES 73 (2009) [hereinafter ERA LOUISIANA 
REPORT]. 
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TABLE 3:  
COMMON TYPES OF FILM INCENTIVES 
Incentive Type Description 
Production Grants A production grant is directed toward a percentage of the total production 
cost of a project spent.  This type of incentive differs from a (refundable) 
production tax credit since it can be disbursed to the production company 
prior to the start of filming a project, thereby reducing financing costs. 
Production Tax 
Credits 
Production tax credits are tax credits that are generally based on a 
percentage of labor costs, and/or a combination of materials, services and 
other costs related to production.  These credits may or may not be 
transferable.  These credits usually have a minimum state/provincial spend, 
may be capped per production or per employee, might require a minimum 
percentage of the total production be shot in the state/province and 
generally apply to certain types of productions (e.g., feature films, 
television, commercials, etc.). 
Labor Rebates Labor rebates differ from labor-based production tax credits since they 
allow for funds to be dispersed during production.  In this respect they are 
similar to grants and do not require a waiting period. 
Regional Incentives Regional incentives are generally offered for film and television projects 
that are undertaken outside of a metropolitan area and provide a “bonus” 
production or labor tax credit. 
Training Incentives Similar to regional tax credits, a training incentive acts as a bonus.  
Digital Incentives The newest type of incentives being offered, digital incentives provide a tax 
credit for the production of digital images. 
Investments in or 
Loans to Productions 
Select jurisdictions may provide investments or loans to selected types of 
production projects. 
 
ERA claimed that common incentive packages offered by states 
“apply either tax credits or rebates to local qualifying expenditures.”
88
  
ERA noted the important difference between a tax credit and a tax rebate: 
A rebate is money back from the state, whereas a tax credit is 
a reduction in the filmmaker’s overall tax liability. 
The difference between a refundable tax credit and a 
transferable tax credit is a crucial one, but it is often overlooked.  
Refundable tax credits are far more lucrative to filmmakers.  
When productions have tax liability, a refundable tax credit 
entitles them to a check from the state for their out-of-pocket 
liability.  In the instance of a transferable credit, however, the 
production company must sell its remaining tax credits to other 
taxpayers (often wealthy individuals or companies).
89
 
Moreover, ERA argued that transferable credits (which Louisiana 
has) are less desirable to filmmakers for several reasons:
90
 
 
 88. Id. at 72. 
 89. Id. 
 90. The ERA’s willingness to inform Louisiana that its scheme was “less desirable” 
helped establish the report’s credibility and mollified this author’s concern(s) of bias.  Id. 
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First, buyers of these transferable tax credits do not pay the full 
value of the tax credits—they buy them at a discount.  Second, 
the process involves accountants, lawyers and other middlemen, 
who also must be paid for their time.  Third, the process can be 
an administrative burden and often takes many months for the 
production to claim the proceeds of their remaining tax credits.  
Every step in this process chips away some value from the 
incentive.  This contrasts with a refundable tax credit, whereby 
productions often get a check for their full liability within 30 
days of ending their production.
91
 
While transferable credits may be less desirable to filmmakers, 
they are as costly to the state.  Tannenwald notes: 
Transferable tax credits are also lucrative deals for film producers 
and in the long run just as costly to the state.  Producers can sell 
such credits to other companies that owe taxes to the state, 
regardless of their line of business.  The sale is usually 
undertaken with the assistance of the state itself and/or a financial 
intermediary that packages purchased film tax credits from 
multiple states to make them more attractive to potential 
purchasers.
92
 
There is another little known wrinkle regarding transferable film credits 
that would likely draw public ire and greatly diminish their popularity in 
public opinion polls if it were ever widely reported:  The players in the 
transferable film credit market.  This group consists of large insurance 
companies and financial institutions that benefited from federal bailouts in 
recent years and are now profiting off of the backs of state taxpayers: 
Often, those purchasers are financial services firms.  Insurance 
companies find purchases of film tax credits especially profitable, 
since they can use them to reduce taxes on premiums.  Through 
the end of fiscal year 2009, insurance companies had purchased 
about half of all transferred Massachusetts film tax credits, for 
example, and other financial institutions had purchased about a 
quarter of them.  In Connecticut, Bank of America and 
Wachovia—two large banking institutions that have recently 
benefited from federal financial assistance—purchased a 
combined $7 million in film tax credits in 2006 and 2007.
93
 
B.  The Incentives Arms Race 
In ERA’s 2009 report, New Mexico, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Michigan and New York—in addition to Louisiana—were designated the 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. TANNENWALD, supra note 84, at 3–4. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
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most aggressive states (in terms of competitive film incentives in the U.S.); 
Michigan, whose incentives include a refundable tax credit of up to 42% on 
in-state expenditures, was deemed the most aggressive.
94
  In ERA’s 2006 
report, Louisiana, South Carolina, New Mexico, Florida, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut and Georgia were the designated “aggressive incentive states” 
and South Carolina, which offered a 30% refundable tax credit, was 
designated the most aggressive.
95
 
That Michigan supplanted South Carolina as the most aggressive 
film incentive state illustrates a fundamental problem with the current 
incentive scheme in the U.S.:  The race to the bottom.  In just three years, 
South Carolina’s standing as the most aggressive film incentive state in 
2006 was not only supplanted by Michigan’s enormous 42% rebate, but the 
state was not even mentioned in ERA’s 2009 report as being “aggressive.” 
The “aggressive states” in ERA’s 2006 and 2009 reports (seen in 
Table 4 below) were not aggressive enough, however, to make it on to the 
MPAA’s top ten film and television production states, according to the 
association’s 2006 and 2009 economic impact reports.  The MPAA’s 2006 
economic impact report ranked California and New York one and two, 
respectively, of the top “production states in 2005.”
96
  The other states on 
the list, in descending order, were Nevada, Arizona, North Carolina, 
Montana, New Jersey, Louisiana, New Mexico and Illinois.
97
 
In the MPAA’s 2009 economic impact report, the top ten 
production states (after California and New York) were:  Illinois, Texas, 
Florida, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North Carolina, Louisiana, 
Tennessee and Massachusetts.
98
  While the 2009 report bumped Arizona 
and New Mexico from the top ten list, both states, in addition to Michigan, 
Utah and Connecticut were deemed “states to watch” based on “amount of 
productions industry-wide; production employees and wages; and the total 
 
 94. ERA LOUISIANA REPORT, supra note 87, at 78.  Michigan’s complete incentive 
package includes: 
(1) 40% refundable tax credit, across the board on Michigan expenditures, with 
an extra 2% if filming in one of the 103 Core Communities in Michigan.  
(Labor and Crew: 40%–42% Resident Below the Line. 40%–42% Above the 
Line regardless of domicile. 30% Non-resident Below the Line).  (2) A 25% tax 
credit on infrastructure investments of > $250,000, up to $10 million.  (3) A 
50% refundable job training tax credit to provide on-the-job training for 
Michigan residents in advanced below-the-line crew positions on qualified 
productions.  (4) A 0% investment loan program is available for up to $15 
million per project, with back end participation in lieu of interest.” 
Id.  
 95. ECONOMICS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, TRENDS IN FILM, MUSIC & DIGITAL MEDIA 49 
(2006). 
 96. 2006 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 2009 MPAA ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. 
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number of vendors and vendor payments made by MPAA studios during 
2007 . . . as well as 2008 production levels, tax incentives, and economic 
impact of the industry.”
99
 
 
TABLE 4: 
ERA’S  “AGGRESSIVE INCENTIVE” STATES (2006 & 2009) AND THE MPAA’S “TOP 
PRODUCTION STATES” (2006 & 2009)
100
 
2006  
ERA Report 
2009  
ERA Report 
2006  
MPAA Report
101
 
2009  
MPAA Report 
Louisiana Louisiana California  Illinois 
South Carolina*  Connecticut New York Texas 
New Mexico Georgia Nevada Florida 
Florida Michigan*  Arizona Georgia 
Rhode Island New York North Carolina Pennsylvania 
Connecticut New Mexico Montana New Jersey 
Georgia  New Jersey North Carolina 
  Louisiana  Louisiana  
  New Mexico Tennessee  
*ERA’s most aggressive Illinois Massachusetts 
 
In January 2010, a special report by The Tax Foundation, a 
nonpartisan research institute in Washington D.C., discussed the pernicious 
nature of the race to the bottom, which it compared to an arms race: 
It is not only the quantity of MPIs offered that increased; they 
have also grown in magnitude.  States entering the game late 
were behind and they knew it.  Early adopters had developed 
infrastructure and economies of scale that made production 
cheaper.  To catch up, late adopters have sought to overcome this 
disadvantage by offering even larger incentives. 
Michigan, for example, now offers credits worth 30 to 50 
percent of personnel expenditures and up to 42 percent of 
production expenditures, besting even Puerto Rico’s 40 percent 
credit.  As a relative latecomer to the film tax credit game, 
Michigan needed a very generous incentive to draw in 
productions, so generous in fact that it will cost an estimated 
$150 million in the current fiscal year.  As part of it, the state 
grants credits for 25 percent of infrastructure investments in an 
explicit effort to catch up with states like Louisiana and New 
Mexico.  But what are they really “catching up” to? . . . 
Each year, legislators have gone back to the drawing board to 
outdo the incentives of neighboring states and give their home 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. In the MPAA’s 2009 report, California and New York were not included in the top 
ten, but they would have been numbers one and two, respectively, had they been. 
 101. The 2006 report is based on 2005 data.  The 2009 report is based on 2007 data. 
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state an edge in attracting movie production.  But this just 
encourages other states to increase their incentives in response.  
As a result, the cost of encouraging film production goes up each 
year.  Incentives that would have lured filmmakers less than a 
decade ago now fall short and taxpayers are left facing bigger 
and bigger bills to support the production incentives “arms 
race.”
102
 
C.  Film Incentives Do Attract Production 
Because of their excessive cost in numerous states, film incentives 
are incapable of being cost-effective or sustainable anywhere near current 
levels in many U.S. states.  That said, leaving the cost issue aside, film 
incentives are incredibly effective at attracting and/or retaining production.  
The production gains in Louisiana and New Mexico after they enacted their 
film incentives in 2002 were breathtaking. 
In Louisiana, the number of films shot (partially and/or entirely) 
went from 1 in 2002 to an estimated 118 in 2010 and the amount of 
production spending increased from $3.5 million (2002) to $674.1 million 
(2010).
103
 
 
TABLE 5:  
LOUISIANA FILM PRODUCTION BUDGET COMPARISON 2002-2010 
Louisiana 
Films 
Actual Budgets of 
Productions 
(Millions) 
Amount of budget 
spent in-state 
(Millions) 
2002 1 $10.5 $3.5 
2003 15 $241.1 $79.6 
2004 32 $413.4 $136.4 
2005 36 $609.3 $201.1 
2006 49 $698.1 $281.2 
2007 86 $450.6 $374.5 
2008 46 $652.7 $474.2 
2009 112 $519.3 $361.5 
2010 (Est.) 118 $1,100.0 $674.1 
 
 
 102. William Luther, Movie Production Incentives: Blockbuster Support for Lackluster 
Policy, 173 TAX FOUNDATION: SPECIAL REPORT 15 (2010).   
 103. CHERYL LOUISE BAXTER, BAXSTARR CONSULTING GROUP LLC, FISCAL & ECONOMIC 
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S ENTERTAINMENT INCENTIVES 20 (2011). 
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In New Mexico, the number of “major [projects]” increased from 5 in 2003 
to a high of 30 in 2008 before decreasing to 16 in 2010, while production 
spending increased from $26.4 million (2003) to a peak of $274.9 million 
(2008) before decreasing to $206.4 million (2010).
104
   
 
TABLE 6:  
NEW MEXICO MAJOR PROJECT SPENDING 2003-2010 
New 
Mexico “Major 
Projects” 
Actual in-state 
spend (million) 
2003 5 $26.40 
2004 7 $12.00 
2005 16 $62.00 
2006 21 $153.40 
2007 22 $151.10 
2008 30 $274.90 
2009 24 $260.20 
2010 16 $206.40 
 
There are two likely explanations why states with recently enacted 
film incentives have not seen the same level of feature film productions 
gains enjoyed by New Mexico, Louisiana and Michigan.  First, with 40 
states now offering competitive incentives, the market is oversaturated.  
With so many substantial incentives to choose from, it is not possible for 
any one state to duplicate the success of New Mexico and Louisiana.  
However, Michigan is the exception to this, likely due to the enormous size 
of the incentive. 
Second, the number of films that get released each year is finite.  
With so many state incentives that effectively slash the cost of producing a 
movie by 25-40%, one might expect the raw number of films that get 
produced to increase.  This has not been the case. 
The number of films released by MPAA member studios has 
generally declined since 1999, going from 200 (1999) to 162 (2008), as 
seen in the chart below.
105
  The number of independent films, however, has 
steadily increased over the same period.
106
  In 1999, 456 new films (as 
opposed to re-issues) were released, compared to 606 in 2008, an increase 
of 33% overall.
107
  Most of the growth came from non-MPAA affiliated 
 
 104. N.M. FILM OFFICE, FILM/MEDIA PRODUCTION STATISTICS FY2003 – FY2011 (2011). 
 105. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THEATRICAL MARKET STATISTICS 2008 
5 (2009). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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independents, which saw a seventy-three percent increase from 1999-
2008.
108
  For the same time the number of new MPAA films decreased 
19%.
109
 
CHART 4: 
THE DECLINE OF MPAA RELEASES VS. THE INCREASE OF INDEPENDENT FILMS 
 
D.  Film Incentive Critics’ Misunderstanding of How Productions Decide 
Where to Film 
One of the biggest flaws in the reasoning of film incentive critics is 
their lack of knowledge about the film industry, its economics, and how 
location decisions are made in Hollywood.  In short, many critics have 
been under the false impression that filmmakers do not significantly 
consider film incentives when deciding where to shoot. 
One of the earliest critics of film incentives was David Brunori, a 
contributor to State Tax Notes.  In March 2008, Brunori received a letter 
from a New Mexico resident, who informed him that four movies filmed in 
that state were up for Oscars:  No Country for Old Men, 3:10 to Yuma, 
Valley of Elah and Transformers.
110
  Brunori admitted that he did not know 
a great deal about filmmaking, which he demonstrated by taking issue with 
the letter writer’s point that the movies would not have shot in New Mexico 
without tax incentives: 
I don’t know much about moviemaking.  But I do know that all 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. David Brunori, Maybe Politicians Will Swear Off Swearing Not to Raise Taxes, 
STATE TAX NOTES, Mar. 2008, at 716. 
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four of those movies were shot in vast, desertlike [sic] terrain.  
One thing that New Mexico has is vast, desertlike [sic] terrain.  
Do you think it’s possible that the movie guys picked New 
Mexico because they needed vast, desertlike [sic] terrain?
111
 
Even if all films depended on a vast desert-like terrain, why would 
they shoot in New Mexico when California has its own deserts and 
neighboring Nevada and Arizona also have the needed terrain?
112
  New 
Mexico had tax credits and the other states, at that time, did not.  Moreover, 
if the tax incentives were not the motivating factor for the shoot, why not 
film in the locations where the films are set?  Texas, for example, is the 
setting for No Country for Old Men and Yuma, Arizona, is the setting for 
3:10 to Yuma.  No Country for Old Men spent $12 to $17 million of its $25 
million budget in New Mexico, where it qualified for a 25% rebate on 
production expenses.
113
  It is not clear if Brunori was trying to be sarcastic 
and humorous, or if he is truly ignorant of filmmaking practices.  What 
seems clear is that Brunori lacks any sense of how the motion picture 
industry works and this undermines his comments and arguments against 
film incentives. 
Brunori is not the only contributor to State Tax Notes opposed to 
film incentives.  In June 2008, Billy Hamilton reported on the “angst” in 
Texas about losing film production to Louisiana and New Mexico, 
exacerbated by films like “2007’s No Country for Old Men, a film set 
almost entirely in Texas but mostly filmed in New Mexico.”
114
 
Hamilton seems naïve about what factors motivate filmmakers to 
shoot in a particular locale, apparently unaware that cost is the primary 
concern for most productions.  Moviemakers, Hamilton said, “have to 
shoot movies somewhere, and Texas has a modestly impressive portfolio of 
film work to recommend it to moviemakers.”
115
  Other than the occasional 
movie about the Alamo, Hamilton said that the following about the state’s 
“impressive portfolio”:
116
 
Sandra Bullock filmed Hope Floats near Austin.  Dazed and 
Confused was filmed around Austin.  Giant with Rock Hudson, 
Elizabeth Taylor, and James Dean was filmed near Marfa in 
 
 111. Id. at 715–16. 
 112. Not all of the movies Brunori mentioned needed to be shot in a vast “desertlike [sic] 
terrain.”  Id.  Transformers, for example, filmed in New Mexico because part of the plot 
takes place in a U.S. military base in the Middle East.  The studio wanted the film to shoot 
in Canada to take advantage of the tax incentives there, but Michael Bay refused. 
 113. David Miles, Coen Brothers Coming to N.M., THE SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, April 
14, 2006, at A1. 
 114. Billy Hamilton, Is Texas Losing the ‘Arms Race’ to Become the New Hollywood?, 
STATE TAX NOTES, June 2008, at 907. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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1956.  In 1961 the great John Ford shot the not-so-great Two 
Rode Together with Richard Widmark and Jimmy Stewart near 
the Alamo set Wayne built for The Alamo.  Hud, The Last 
Picture Show, Bonnie and Clyde, Friday Night Lights, Urban 
Cowboy, The Texas Chainsaw Massacre, The Killer Shrews—the 
list is long.
117
 
Hamilton took issue with press coverage in Austin, Texas, about 
increased filming in New Mexico and Louisiana, which were “besting 
Texas.”
118
  Hamilton offers his own “hard-hitting” evidence: 
Just to give you some idea of what a travesty that is, the Internet 
Movie Database (IMDB) lists 342 movies and television shows 
with “Texas” in their titles.  It lists a mere 29 featuring the word 
“Louisiana.”  New Mexico has an even more paltry 14 mentions.  
So, what’s the problem?”
119
 
In response to Hamilton’s last question above, the problem is the 
unscientific nature of a rudimentary search of productions titles on IMDB.  
Had Hamilton bothered to conduct an IMDB search of the actual filming 
locations of these films, the results may have been more illuminating but 
still of no meaningful value.  When critics make arguments based on such 
ridiculous “research” methods, their credibility is significantly diminished.  
This is regrettable because it may serve to hurt the case of other film 
incentive critics who do make sound arguments based on credible research. 
Putting aside issues of credibility, Hamilton also displays a lack of 
sensitivity to the human element of the runaway production problem.  For 
example, Hamilton said Canada’s 1997 film incentives is where the trouble 
really began:  “Films that could have been made in the United States were 
for financial reasons no longer being made here.  Suddenly runaway film 
production was a major concern—well, at least a major concern for some 
people.”
120
  Some people?  Hamilton’s insensitivity to anyone in the film 
industry who lost a significant portion of his or her income—if not his or 
her career—because of runaway productions is odious on many levels. 
Nevertheless, Hamilton did acknowledge that film production does 
result in private economic activity, but, despite this, he correctly pointed 
out that “there is little hard economic evidence that incentives at the 
stratospheric levels they have now achieved can be justified 
economically.”
121
  Without such economic evidence, Hamilton said 
supporters of film incentives are “beginning to steer clear of the economic 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 908. 
 121. Id. at 911. 
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development argument as a primary justification” and instead, “they are 
making a cultural argument.”
122
 
Brunori and Hamilton base the value of film incentives on a narrow 
litmus test:  Does the state get back enough revenue from the economic 
activity related to film production to cover or exceed the cost of the tax 
incentive?  If yes, the film incentive is good; if no, the film incentive is 
bad.  Let the debate begin. 
V.   DEBATING THE VALUE OF FILM INCENTIVES 
In June 2011, the economic toll of the race to the bottom was 
staggering.  According to a study released by the Tax Foundation, forty 
states offered a record $1.4 billion in film incentives in 2010, predicted to 
be the “peak year” for state spending on film incentives.
123
  As seen in the 
following table (Table 7), over the last decade, states spent over $5.8 
billion on film incentives, most of which (over $4.7 billion) was spent since 
2008.
124
 
 
TABLE 7:  
FILM INCENTIVE SPENDING 
Year 
Number of States with 
Film Incentive Programs 
Incentive Amounts 
Offered 
1999 & earlier 4 $2 million 
2000 4 $3 million 
2001 4 $1 million 
2002 5 $1 million 
2003 5 $2 million 
2004 9 $68 million 
2005 15 $129 million 
2006 24 $369 million 
2007 33 $489 million 
2008 35 $807 million 
2009 40 $1.247 billion 
2010 40 $1.396 billion 
2011 37 $1.299 billion 
 
The Tax Foundation’s numbers match closely with a three-year 
study conducted by the Associated Press, the major findings of which are 
set forth in the chart below.
125
  From 2006 to 2008, the study tracked forty-
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Joseph Henchman, More States Abandon Film Tax Incentives as Programs’ 
Ineffectiveness Becomes More Apparent, TAX FOUNDATION: FISCAL FACT NO. 272. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Ben Nuckols and Martha Waggoner, States Give Hollywood a Fortune in Tax 
Breaks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 2, 2009. 
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one states with film incentives.  In that period, film incentive states spent a 
combined total of $1.8 billion on film tax credits, rebates and other 
incentives.
126
  More than half of the total, or $1 billion (compared to the 
$807 million reported by the Tax Foundation), was paid out in 2008 
alone.
127
  However, unlike the Tax Foundation, the Associated Press also 
reported total in-state film spending, which reached nearly $10 billion for 
the same period.
128
 
 
CHART 5: 
 
Since the amount of in-state spending was close to six times more 
than the total cost of the film incentives in 2008, these tax incentives may 
seem like a very sound investment to the casual observer.  Indeed, the 
disparity between these two categories (cost of incentive and in-state 
spending) presents, perhaps, the greatest impediment to ending the 
“madness” of the current incentive war.  Credible analyses of wave after 
wave of state-level data regarding various film-incentive programs lead to 
the harsh reality that, for almost every state offering film incentives, 
benefits do not outweigh costs.  This data, which can include specific 
spending breakdowns of individual productions in specific jurisdictions, is 
now allowing for accurate and reliable economic impact forecasting and 
impact analysis to take place. 
The report findings from jurisdictions where this type of analysis 
takes place are virtually unanimous:  Film incentives do not provide a 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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positive economic return for the state treasuries from which they are 
funded.  The only possible exceptions to this rule—discussed in detail 
later—are New York, California, and other states with very modest film 
incentives (under 10%, for example). 
A.  Evaluating the Economic Reports 
According to Susan Christopherson and Ned Rightor’s extensive 
review of available economic impact studies on various film incentive 
programs, the majority of programs negatively impacted state tax revenues: 
“The overwhelming majority of fiscal impact analyses of film and TV 
subsidy programs conclude that the subsidies have a negative impact on 
state revenues. . . .”
129
 
Additionally, in November 2010, Robert Tannenwald of 
the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities studied ten 
independently prepared economic impact reports, eight of which 
showed that incentives were a net drain on revenue.
130
  However, as 
Tannenwald notes, the two reports that found film incentives did 
pay for themselves were biased because those studies “were 
financed by the Motion Picture Association of America and/or a 
state office of film and tourism.”
131
 
While Tannenwald concedes that film incentives are effective if 
judged by their ability to attract productions, he prefers an economic 
analysis that evaluates the merit of such incentive programs in the long run: 
However, even if states attract productions with lucrative 
subsidies, the merit of such subsidies as tools of long-run 
economic development—which is how the entertainment 
industry pitches them—rests not on the number of films they 
attract but rather on the extent to which they generate good, 
stable jobs and income for residents in a cost-effective manner.
132
 
Thus, despite the numerous economic impact reports that Tannenwald 
reviewed, a 2009 report prepared by the Massachusetts Department of 
Revenue was the “only independent, in-depth empirical study to date that 
properly evaluates a film subsidy according to this criterion.”
133
 
 
 129. Susan Christopherson & Ned Rightor, The Creative Economy As “Big Business”: 
Evaluating State Strategies to Lure Filmmakers, 29 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RESEARCH 336, 
341 (2010). 
 130. TANNENWALD, supra note 84, at 16. 
 131. See id. at 8 (“The only studies claiming that a state film subsidy pays for itself were 
financed by the Motion Picture Association of America and/or a state office of film and 
tourism.”).  See also id. at 10 (criticizing at length the Ernst & Young report prepared at the 
request of the New Mexico State Film Office for its major flaws). 
 132. Id. at 5. 
 133. Id. 
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As of January 2011, forty-four states, including all of the major 
players in the film incentive arms race, faced massive budget shortfalls that 
totaled a staggering $125 billion.
134
  The outrageous expense of funding 
film incentives would be condemnable public policy even if these states 
were experiencing surpluses, but the current economic picture makes them 
even more disastrous.  According to Tannenwald, balanced budget 
requirements in all but one state mean that lawmakers electing to keep their 
respective film incentive programs will be forced to “cut public services or 
increase taxes elsewhere to make ends meet.”
135
  As Tannenwald notes, 
state spending on film incentives in 2010 alone could have “paid for the 
salaries of 23,500 middle school teachers, 26,600 firefighters, and 22,800 
police patrol officers.”
136
 
Justifying cuts to schools and police forces in order to preserve 
film incentives might be acceptable to some people, assuming that the film 
incentive programs actually benefit the residents of the state offering them.  
According to Tannenwald, however, this is often not the case: 
The [2009 Massachusetts Department of Revenue Report] . . . 
clearly shows that the Commonwealth’s film tax subsidies have 
disproportionately benefited non-residents.  It estimates that 
between calendar years 2006 and 2008, residents enjoyed only 16 
percent of the compensation paid to employees working on 
Massachusetts-based major film productions.  
. . . . 
Information from other states also suggests that many of the 
economic benefits of film productions go out of state.  In 
Connecticut, only 11 percent of spending eligible for the state’s 
film tax credit in fiscal year 2009 was described in tax credit 
applications as “actual Connecticut expenditures.” According to 
the Arizona Department of Commerce, film producers subsidized 
by the state in calendar year 2008 spent 62 percent of their 
budgets outside of Arizona.  A study of Michigan’s film tax 
subsidies by Michigan State University concluded that in fiscal 
year 2008, film producers spent 47.5 percent of their budgets out 
of state.  And in 2008, the Providence Journal, after threatening a 
lawsuit, obtained information from the Rhode Island Office of 
Film and Television concerning the production of the film “Hard 
Luck.”  Of the $11 million spent on this production in Rhode 
Island, only 17 percent went to Rhode Island residents or 
 
 134. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET AL., STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 3 
(2011). 
 135. Id. at 8. 
 136. Id. at 2. 
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businesses.
137
 
A 2009 report from the Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 
like Tannenwald’s study, compared its findings to those in ten other major 
studies.  Despite the different methodologies employed in the various 
studies and the vast differences between the states and their respective film 
incentives, the report found that the studies were generally consistent: 
Other than those carried out by the consulting firm Ernst & 
Young, the studies estimated that state revenues generated by 
new film production activity ranged from $0.07 to $0.28 per 
dollar of tax credit granted, although some of the studies did not 
assume that film tax credits needed to be funded by spending cuts 
or revenue increases, despite balanced budget requirements in 
virtually all those states.  Because those studies do not account 
for the negative multiplier impacts of required state spending cuts 
or revenue increases, they tend to overestimate net economic 
activity and state revenue generated by the tax incentives.  In 
calculating multiplier impacts, some of the studies also appear 
not to have made adjustments for wages paid to non-resident 
employees. 
While the return-on-investment estimates in these studies are 
not always comparable between states due to different tax credit 
programs (e.g., the higher the tax credit rate, the lower the rate of 
return tends to be, and not all states allow a sales tax exemption 
for production-related purchases, and such an exemption tends to 
reduce the rate of return), different tax systems, and divergent 
local economic interrelationships, the studies generally are 
consistent with each other.
138
 
It is also worth noting that many of the in-depth studies prepared 
by various state agencies offer thorough and objective analyses that 
explicitly refrain from making any determinations about their desirability 
or efficacy.  Rather, the studies leave such determinations to state 
policymakers.  The 2009 Massachusetts Department of Revenue report, for 
example, makes quite clear that the Department of Revenue is not judging 
the desirability of the film incentive: 
Whether a tax incentive program is desirable is not solely a 
function of how much revenue it generates, but also whether the 
economic activity that it causes is judged to be favorable for the 
Commonwealth.  The Department does not take any position on 
 
 137. Id. at 6–7 (citations omitted). 
 138. NAVJEET K. BAL, MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, A REPORT ON THE MASSACHUSETTS 
FILM INDUSTRY TAX INCENTIVES 23 (2009) [hereinafter MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE REPORT 
2009]. 
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the desirability of particular tax incentive programs.
139
 
Similarly, a 2010 report prepared for the Michigan Senate 
Fiscal Agency makes clear that it is only reporting the effect the 
film incentive has on the state’s budget, which is significant, and 
not touching on the efficacy of the program, which is left to policy-
makers: 
Over time, these costs of the Media Production Credit and the 
other film-related incentives are expected to grow rapidly and 
will likely have a significant impact on the budget.  As with other 
types of incentives and credits, whether the relationship of costs 
to benefits is acceptable is a decision for individual policy-
makers.
140
 
The following table (Table 8) provides an overview of the 
findings in several economic impact reports on film incentives that 
highlight the cost of the program, the in-state vs. out-of-state 
benefit, the cost of each job created, and the actual “return on 
investment” that the respective states realized: 
 
TABLE 8:  
ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT OVERVIEW 
Study/ 
Report 
Cost of Program 
(in millions) 
Benefit In-
State vs. Out 
of State 
Cost Per Job Return on 
Investment  
Massachusetts 
DOR 2010 
2006: $19.1 
2007: $38.7 
2008: $119.6 
2009: $82.4 
Total: $259.8141 
2009: 78% of all 
wages paid to 
non-residents 
51% of all non-
wage expenses 
benefit out-of-
state businesses 
67% of all 
production 
spending benefit 
in-state142 
2009: $123,130 
for each new job 
created (residents 
and non-residents) 
$324,838 per 
Massachusetts 
resident143 
For every $100 
“invested,” $86 
lost144   
Michigan 
Senate Fiscal 
Agency 2010 
2008: $37.5 
2009: $100 
2010: $125 
Total: $262.5145 
2009: 52.6% of 
all production 
spending benefit 
in-state146 
2008: $186,519 
for each direct job 
created;  $42,991 
for direct/indirect 
jobs created 
2010: Minus the 
47% of the 
economic 
activity, the state 
will lose (spend) 
 
 139. Id. at 25. 
 140. DAVID ZIN, FILM INCENTIVES IN MICHIGAN 2 (2010) [hereinafter MICH. FILM 
INCENTIVES REPORT]. 
 141. MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE REPORT 2009, supra note 138, at 2. 
 142. Id. at 9. 
 143. Id. at 17. 
 144. Id. 
 145. MICH. FILM INCENTIVES REPORT, supra note 140, at 1. 
 146. Id. 
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2009: $193,333 
for each direct job 
created; $44,561 
for direct /indirect 
jobs created147 
 
$111.5 million to 
generate $78.5 in 
private activity148 
 
Arizona 
Department of 
Commerce 
2009 
2008: $8.6 149 38% of all 
production 
spending was in-
state150 
$16,587 per job 
created151 
For every $100 
“invested,” $72 
lost152 
Texas 
Comptroller 
Report 2010 
2009: $48.4  
 
Breakdown  
$12.8: film 
$24.5: TV  
$2.0: commercials 
$9: video games 153  
[No data 
available] 
Each film, TV and 
commercial job 
cost between 
$18,500 & 
$19,000 
Each new video 
game cost 
$5,332.154 
The report 
acknowledges 
that after each 
film, TV and 
commercial 
project is 
completed, the 
“created” jobs 
“leave the 
state”155  
 
When looking at the waste on a per-project basis, the excessiveness of 
various film incentive programs is further crystallized.  In 2010, for 
example, Louisiana spent almost $100 million on just four films: 
For Battle: Los Angeles, which is completed and released, the 
total budget was $68.8 million, the Louisiana spend was $45.2 
million, and the tax credits certified were $13.6 million. 
For Green Lantern, the estimated total budget is $118 million, 
and the Louisiana spend is forecast to be $114 million, and the 
tax credits expected to be issued are $34.2 million. 
Battleship reported an estimated total budget of $215 million; 
Louisiana spend is forecast to be $68 million, and the tax credits 
expected to be issued are $20.4 million. 
For Twilight, the estimated total budget is $247 million, the 
Louisiana spend is $98 million, and the tax credits expected to be 
issued are $29.4 million.
156
 
 
 147. Id. at 11. 
 148. Id. at 25. 
 149. KENT ENNIS ET AL., ARIZ. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION TAX 
INCENTIVES PROGRAM 7 (2008). 
 150. Id. at 13. 
 151. Id. at 17. 
 152. Id. 
 153. SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, AN ANALYSIS OF TEXAS 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 60 (2010). 
 154. Id. at 61. 
 155. Id. at 64. 
 156. Baxter, supra note 103, at 24. 
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The $34.2 million Louisiana awarded to Green Lantern surpassed the 
previous record holder in the state, The Curious Case of Benjamin Button, 
to which Louisiana gave $27 million.
157
 
Michigan, however, has Louisiana beat.  In 2010, the state awarded 
a whopping $39.96 million to just one film, Oz: The Great and Powerful.
158
  
The film was expected to employ 251 people, roughly half of who were 
out-of-state residents, making Michigan taxpayers pay approximately 
$300,000 for each job created.
159
  The cost for each direct production job on 
Red Dawn, to which Michigan awarded $16.7 million (based on $44 
million the film spent in-state), was a ridiculous $423,727.
160
  And, even 
more wasteful, the cost for each direct production job on Master Class was 
a staggering, if not unbelievable, $706,460!
161
 
One might expect a significant public outcry over the findings 
reported above, causing film backers to lay off their overzealous claims of 
how fantastic the film incentives have been for their respective state.  To 
the astonishment of this author, however, the outcry came, but it came from 
film backers and directed at the people reporting the staggering cost and 
inefficiency of the film incentive programs. 
On the same day Tannenwald’s report was released, the MPAA 
issued a press release expressing its outrage.  Vans Stevenson, Senior Vice 
President of State Government Affairs for the MPAA, said Tannenwald’s 
report was careless at best: 
“This politically motivated, slipshod report by a think tank in 
Washington, DC, demonstrates no understanding of the film and 
television industry, nor the importance of the jobs and economic 
development produced by these tax credits in states all across our 
nation,” Stevenson said.  “Bottom line, this is a report produced 
by an organization that has already proclaimed itself antagonistic 
to tax cuts and incentives and it found a way to examine the data 
to back up its own prejudiced point of view.”
162
 
Stevenson’s comments are distasteful and flawed for a variety of reasons.  
Stevenson’s claim that Tannenwald’s report was “politically motivated” is 
baseless, which may be why he makes no attempt to back it up.  Similarly, 
 
 157. Michigan Spending $40 Million to Subsidize “Oz: The Great & Powerful”!! Sets 
New Record for State Spend on Single Production!, RUNAWAY PROD. RESEARCH (Mar. 4, 
2011), http://www.stop-runaway-production.com/2011/03/04/michigan-spending-40-million 
-on-one-single-movie-sets-new-record-for-state-spend-on-single-production/. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. MICH. FILM INCENTIVES REPORT, supra note 140, at 13. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Press Release, Statement by the Motion Picture Ass’n of America on Biased Study 
About Film and Television Credits (Nov. 17, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Film 
Credits Press Release]. 
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Stevenson offers no explanation of how or why, at least in his opinion, the 
report is somehow “slipshod.”  If anything, the only thing slipshod is 
Stevenson’s reaction and unsupported allegations.  Finally, it is ironic for 
someone representing the trade and lobbying association of all major 
Hollywood studios to say it is a public education research group that is the 
prejudiced party. 
The MPAA’s response lauds the numerous states that have kept—
or expanded—the scope of their incentives even as they face “dire budget 
situations.”
163
  However, states that had “recently terminated” their film 
incentives, specifically Kansas and Wisconsin, are dismissed by the MPAA 
as “not competitive”.
164
  In what may be the most breathtaking and 
irresponsible part of its response, the MPAA claimed film incentive 
programs could “do wonders” for troubled states and are “revenue 
positive”:
165
 
The film and television incentive programs can do wonders and 
are a robust economic stimulus.  New investment in film and 
digital media production is, on balance, revenue positive.  In the 
short term, it generates substantial tax revenues with credit 
claims paid eighteen to twenty four months after production has 
wrapped.
166
 
This begs the question:  How can the MPAA support its claim that film 
incentives are revenue positive? 
Of the ten studies of film incentives surveyed in Tannenwald’s 
report, only two contain revenue positive findings.
167
  Ernst & Young 
prepared both of these “studies”; the New Mexico Film Office paid for one, 
and the other, for New York, was paid for in part by the MPAA.
168
  In the 
words of the MPAA, the New York report appears to be “politically 
motivated” and “produced by an organization that has already proclaimed 
itself antagonistic to tax cuts and incentives” that had “found a way to 
examine the data to back up its own prejudiced point of view.”
169
  The 
irony is that the report prepared for the MPAA is also the one that best 
meets the MPAA’s definition of slipshod. 
Slipshod indeed.  The Massachusetts Department of Revenue and 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston discredit the Ernst & Young reports for a 
variety of reasons: 
The two Ernst & Young studies estimated much higher rates of 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. TANNENWALD, supra note 84, at 16. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Film Credits Press Release, supra note 162, at 1. 
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tax revenues generated, but as pointed out in a recent Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston report, those studies assumed that all 
above-the-line and below-the-line non-resident wages would be 
spent locally, did not make adjustments for production activity 
that would have occurred even in the absence of the tax 
incentives, did not assume a balanced budget requirement, and in 
the case of the New Mexico study, based its estimates of 
increased tourism expenditures on a seemingly questionable 
tourism survey.
170
 
Despite overwhelming evidence showing how costly, inefficient 
and unaffordable film incentives are (at their current Canadian-style 
levels), film backers continue to insist they are solid investments for state 
governments.  Whether they are willfully ignorant of reality or genuinely 
convinced they are right (despite having no substantial or credible evidence 
to support their claims) is unknown.  But the unfortunate result of this 
persistence is that the public policy disaster is being unnecessarily 
prolonged since some state lawmakers are influenced by these film 
backers—or are in the film backer ranks themselves. 
B.  The Debate in New Mexico 
Lawmakers and film backers in New Mexico seem completely 
unaware of how flawed the Ernst & Young report prepared for their state 
actually is.  They believe the film incentive program in their state actually 
generates revenue and supports 10,000 jobs in their state.
171
  The 10,000 
jobs claim likely stems from the Ernst & Young report, which actually 
reported the number of supported jobs at 9,209.
172
  According to a Federal 
Reserve Bank report on the flawed Ernst & Young reports, however, once 
the jobs attributed to the incentive in tourism (3,827) and one-time 
construction of a single movie studio (1,553) are removed from the 
equation, the actual number of jobs supported is actually closer to 3,827.
173
 
When it was first implemented, the New Mexico film incentive 
offered a 15% rebate.
174
  In 2006, it was increased to 25% in an effort to 
 
 170. MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE REPORT 2009, supra note 138, at 23. 
 171. Press Release, Motion Picture Ass’n of N.M., Industry Association Will Not 
Support House Film Substitute (Feb. 27, 2011) (on file with author). 
 172. ERNST & YOUNG, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE NEW MEXICO FILM 
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 11 (2009) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG REPORT]. 
 173. Memorandum from Jennifer Weiner, Policy Analyst at New England Public Policy 
Center at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, to Shelley Geballe, Distinguished Senior 
Fellow at Connecticut Voices for Children (Apr. 2, 2009), www.bos.frb.org/ 
economic/neppc/memos/2009/weiner04209.pdf. 
 174. ERNST & YOUNG REPORT, supra note 172, at 1. 
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remain competitive.
175
  New Mexico’s film incentive program cost the state 
$65.9 million in 2010, $76.4 million in 2009 and $45.6 million in 2008.
176
 
Those were the three years during which the credit was operating at the 
25% level.  In 2007, at 15%, the program cost the state $16.6 million.
177
 
From 2003-2006, the state spent a combined total of $15.3 million.
178
 Thus, 
in 2010 alone, the state spent nearly twice as much ($65.9 million) with the 
25% level than it did for all five years when the incentive was 15%. 
In 2011, faced with a massive budget shortfall, newly elected New 
Mexico Governor Susana Martinez is adamant about scaling the incentive 
back to its pre-2007 level.  With the reduction, Martinez estimates the 
program would free up $25 million, which could be used to soften budget 
cuts to public schools, Medicaid and the Department of Corrections.  
Concerning the Corrections Department, Martinez would likely use $5 
million of the $25 million saved from the film incentive to prevent closing 
some prisons and/or releasing some prisoners early. 
Governor Martinez did not support eliminating the program, 
however, as other lawmakers in the state tried unsuccessfully to do in 
February 2011.  The reduction to 15%, therefore, sounded like a reasonable 
compromise.  To the film community in New Mexico, however, it was 
anything but.  New Mexico lawmakers supportive of the film incentive 
remaining at the 25% level were able to reach a compromise and placed a 
limit on the amount the state would have to pay in the form of a cap. 
Echoing the dubious findings of the Ernst & Young report at a 
debate over the film incentive program in early 2011, Eric Witt, of the 
Motion Picture Association of New Mexico, said that the incentives make 
money and that if the state eliminates or reduces the incentive it will have 
“less money to spend” on things like childcare and schools.
179
  State 
Representative Brian Egolf, at the same debate, repeated the claim that the 
incentive made more money for the state than it cost.
180
  Egolf also said that 
the film industry in New Mexico was clean and could not be outsourced, 
which is laughable given that the incentive program caused it to be 
“outsourced” from other locations, namely California and New York.
181
 
When a $45 million annual cap was being considered in the New 
Mexico Legislature, Witt claimed that the new bill threatened to “destroy 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. N.M. FILM OFFICE, supra note 104. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Video: Film Policy in New Mexico Debate (Motion Picture Assoc. of N.M.) 4:00, 
http://www.stop-runaway-production.com/2011/01/14/new-mexico-film-debate-video-now-
available-watch-now/ (statement of Eric Witt at 4:00) [hereinafter New Mexico Film Debate 
Video]. 
 180. Id. at 9:05 (statement of Brian Egolf). 
 181. Id. at 10:10. 
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New Mexico’s vibrant film industry.”
182
  Witt’s claim is not supported by 
the data he and the Motion Picture Association of New Mexico maintain on 
their website.  According to those statistics, the best year for the New 
Mexico film incentive in terms of the number of major productions 
shooting in the state (thirty), the number of worker days (207,066) and 
financial impact ($824.7 million) was 2008, when the amount of approved 
credits was $45.6 million.
183
  The following table (Table 9) compares these 
data for the following two years, when the state spent more, yet received 
considerably less in return.
184
 
 
TABLE 9:  
NEW MEXICO FILM INCENTIVE SPENDING 
 Cost of 
Credits 
(millions) 
Major  
Productions 
Worker  
Days 
Financial 
Impact 
(millions) 
2008 $45.60 30 207,066 $824.70 
2009 $76.40 24 191,881 $780.60 
2010 $65.90 16 197,474 $619.12 
 
Based on the data above, and given the success of 2008, when the state 
spent just $1.2 million more than the proposed cap, it seems like the New 
Mexico Film Industry would actually benefit from the proposed $45 
million cap. 
C.  The Debate in Massachusetts 
In March 2009, two Massachusetts State Representatives, John 
Keenan and Brian Wallace, praised the state’s film incentive program and 
said, “the cost of the film tax credit is only 14 cents for each new dollar 
generated in the state’s economy by the film industry.”
185
  According to 
Keenan and Wallace, “the benefits to the local economy far outweigh the 
costs. . . . It means creating private sector jobs with private sector pension 
and health care benefits at a cost of pennies on the dollar.”
186
  Keenan and 
Wallace attempted to counter any argument the state could not afford the 
film incentives:  “The question, therefore—especially now—is not whether 
we can afford the film tax credit.  The question is, can we afford to lose the 
jobs and revenue the film tax credit has brought to Massachusetts.”
187
  
 
 182. Press Release, Motion Picture Ass’n of N.M., supra note 171. 
 183. N.M. FILM OFFICE, supra note 104. 
 184. Id. 
 185. John Keenan & Brian Wallace, Editorial, The show must go on, THE BOSTON 
HERALD, Mar. 21, 2009, at 14. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
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Sadly, the two lawmakers seem oblivious to the fact that the film incentive 
in Massachusetts is losing the state more revenue than it generates. 
The argument that, over time, the Massachusetts film incentive 
would become more cost-effective as the state built up its infrastructure and 
the number of skilled workers increased, is not proving to be accurate.  The 
following table (Table 10) shows how the average cost to create each 
“Massachusetts Resident Job” has increased dramatically.
188
 
 
TABLE 10:  
MASSACHUSETTS JOB CREATION COST 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
$52,515 $93,749 $128,695 $324,838 
 
The Department of Revenue offered the following explanation for this 
breathtaking increase:  “The impact of state spending cuts is considerably 
greater in 2009 than in previous years due to the delayed use of film tax 
credits, which results in a smaller net increase in employment in 2009 than 
in previous years.”
189
 
Considering the massive collective cost of film incentives and the 
massive policy ramifications they have for cash-strapped states, it is 
unacceptable for incentive backers like the MPAA, Eric Witt, and others to 
propagate to the public the false notion that film incentives are sound 
investments that are revenue positive.  They are not. 
D.  The Debate in Wisconsin 
In March 2009, the Wisconsin Department of Commerce issued a 
report to “raise the warning flag” about problems with the state’s film 
incentives:
190
 
Commerce feels a duty to raise the warning flag and draw 
attention to several fundamental flaws in the program:  The 
program’s flaws create an incentive to hire out-of-state 
contractors instead of Wisconsin labor.  The program is really 
expensive because it is a refundable tax credit program, not just a 
tax credit program.  The program’s cost-benefit analysis 
compares poorly to other programs aimed at manufacturing, 
technology, and agriculture.
191
 
 
 188. MASS. DEP’T OF REVENUE REPORT 2009, supra note 138, at 17. 
 189. Id. at 18. 
 190. RICHARD J. LEINENKUGEL, WIS. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF 
WISCONSIN FILM TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 2 (2009). 
 191. Id. 
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Thus, the Wisconsin Department of Commerce was fulfilling a 
responsibility to the people of that state by pointing out to the public and 
state lawmakers that the benefit of the program was going to nonresidents.  
The concern raised by the Wisconsin Department of Commerce was 
sufficient to motivate then-Governor Jim Doyle to scale back the amount 
available for funding the incentive to a miniscule $500,000, which his 
“critics” called “incomprehensible.”
192
 
In 2010, newly elected Governor Scott Walker made film backers 
in the state cheer by signaling his intent to revive the program and 
criticizing his predecessor for not giving the program a fair chance:  “Gov. 
Doyle did not give the program a fair chance to take hold.  Reasonable and 
sustainable incentives that give an emphasis in putting Wisconsin people to 
work and growing this industry for the state should receive serious 
consideration.”
193
 
The only thing which is “incomprehensible” is that film advocates 
consider a film which spent $5 million in their state and “received about 
$4.6 million in taxpayer money, including payments that offset part of the 
$5,625.16 paid to Depp’s hairstylist, $16,490 for his makeup artist and 
$38,771.40 for two chauffeurs” a benefit to their state.
194
 
E.  The Debate in New Jersey 
In February 2011, New Jersey’s Economic Development Authority 
(EDA) released a report it had commissioned to study the economic impact 
of the state’s film incentive program.  The study, conducted by the New 
Jersey Institute of Technology (NJIT), found that the program was 
“breaking even” because taxes collected from jobs in the industry were 
$10.1 million while the incentive cost was $10 million.
195
  The EDA, 
however, disputed these findings and recommended that the program be 
terminated.
196
  The EDA noted that the “breaking even” claim was based on 
tax revenue from jobs in the “entire film industry, not just the jobs 
generated by the program subsidy,” and that, at best, the revenue collected 
offset just $5.5 million of the program cost.
197
  Since the intent of the 
program was, in addition to cost effective job creation, to “create 
 
 192. Jay Rath, Cut! Wisconsin’s Moviemaking Tax Incentive Didn’t Get a Fair Chance, 
THE DAILY PAGE, Jan. 6, 2011, www.thedailypage.com/isthmus/article.php?article=31792. 
 193. Id. 
 194. P.J. Huffstutter & Richard Verrier, Filmmaking Incentives Losing Glamour in 
Cash-Strapped States, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep 
/22/business/fi-ct-moviestates22. 
 195. Memorandum from Caren S. Franzini, CEO of the N.J. Econ. Dev. Auth., to 
Treasurer Andrew P. Sidamon-Eristoff (February 17, 2011) (on file with author). 
 196. Id. at 2. 
 197. Id. at 1. 
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predictable new revenue streams” for the state, EDA’s careful analysis of 
the NJIT report was able to show no new revenue streams were being 
created; rather, revenue was being lost.
198
 
F.  Are Film Backers at War with Reality? 
The harsh reality is that time and time again, film incentives have 
been shown to benefit out-of-state business and residents at outrageously 
disproportionate levels.  More outrageous is that, in the face of this reality, 
film backers continue to make misleading claims about the value of film 
incentives and have the temerity to discredit study after study that proves 
everything backers have said about these programs to be false.  Film 
incentive backers, by willfully ignoring reality and continuing to make 
erroneous claims about positive economic impact (whether they believe in 
them or not), are creating confusion in how the pubic perceives these 
incentives.  Ironically, many of the same studies point to the problem of 
confusion: 
Significant confusion appears to exist regarding the public and 
private costs and benefits of the credits.  Statements in the press 
regarding the benefits of the Media Production Credit typically 
highlight the increases in private sector activity and measure 
them against the public sector cost (often without accounting for 
the impact of lowering other public expenditures to offset the lost 
revenue from the credit).  This comparison creates confusion 
about the impact of the credit on the budget.  The nature of the 
credit and the resulting activity is such that under current (and 
any realistic) tax rate the State will never be able to make the 
credit “pay for itself” from a State revenue standpoint, even when 
the credit generates additional private activity that would not 
have otherwise occurred.
199
 
While it is true that film incentives induce new productions, 
resulting in private spending, the revenue generated from this new 
economic activity is never enough to:  (1) make more money than the cost 
of the incentive (revenue positive); (2) generate enough revenue to reach a 
break-even point for the incentive (revenue neutral); or (3) generate enough 
revenue to offset a significant portion (50% or more) of the cost.  The state 
is paying considerable amounts of money to lure film production, which 
will then spend even more money, ideally in that state.  The reality is, 
however, that the spending is not happening.  Even if it were, given the 
present largesse of film incentives in the U.S., the result will almost always 
be revenue negative. 
 
 198. Id. at 2. 
 199. MICH. FILM INCENTIVES REPORT, supra note 140, at 1–2. 
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Any state that believes film incentives are an effective means of 
“creating” a new industry and rationalizes its incentives as investments that 
will pay-off one day is delusional.  What states like New Mexico, 
Louisiana, and Michigan fail to acknowledge is that the industry they are 
attempting to “create” already exists, but it is based in California and New 
York, not the other states.  Perhaps it is time people think of the film 
industry as the “U.S. film industry,” rather than the “California film 
industry” or the “New York film industry.”  The U.S. film industry happens 
to be based in California and New York.  The U.S. auto industry happens to 
be based in Michigan.  The U.S. tobacco industry happens to be based in 
the Carolinas.  The U.S. energy industry happens to be concentrated in 
Texas.  And so on.  The location where each mentioned industry is based is 
often what makes it such an important U.S. industry, either because the 
natural resources are there (oil in Texas, tobacco fields in the Carolinas) or 
the industry cluster has been established over decades (Detroit, Los 
Angeles, and New York).  Given the ridiculous claims made by the MPAA 
or film backers mentioned above, it seems permissible to make what some 
might consider an equally ridiculous claim:  state film incentives are 
unpatriotic.  Is it really that ridiculous?  The Tax Foundation called on state 
officials to observe the issue of film incentives from a national perspective: 
To some extent, evaluating the wealth generated by MPIs 
depends on which level of government one is observing.  From a 
national perspective, even boosters would probably admit that 
little if any wealth is created by these programs.  Jobs created in 
New Mexico are offset by those destroyed in California.  Rather 
than creating wealth, MPIs just shift production from one state to 
another. 
Short-sighted state officials may not be expected to worry too 
much about neighboring states’ job counts, but what goes around 
comes around.  By committing tax dollars and state effort into 
securing film jobs, state officials miss the chance to use those 
resources instead for lowering tax burdens for all industries.  
Because MPIs are a field crowded with state competitors, 
committing huge resources may have little payoff. 
Officials should acknowledge that moving 100 jobs from one 
state to another does nothing for the nation’s economy except 
enrich the film industry at the expense of other state taxpayers.
200
 
The only reason—and the only way—a state like Louisiana can 
capture a significant share of production activity is that it is willing to fund 
roughly one-third of any given film or TV production.  The film and 
 
 200. LUTHER, supra note 102, at 9. 
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television industry will not “take root” in places like Louisiana because it 
already has incredibly deep roots in California and New York. 
Green Lantern shot in Louisiana only because of the $34 million 
the state offered.  No incentives means no Hollywood.  Film incentives will 
bring new productions to such states, but not a new industry that will grow 
on its own; it is already full-grown.  Productions are the apples of an 
industry whose tree is properly rooted in California and New York.  Thus, 
it is time for lawmakers in the other states to recognize and accept they are 
only buying apples (productions) and not the tree (Hollywood).  And in the 
process, by robbing California and New York of the fruits that naturally fall 
there, the other states are hurting the nation and devastating California. 
VI.  TAX INCENTIVES USED AS WEAPONS AGAINST CALIFORNIA 
California, home to Hollywood, is arguably the most significant 
cultural production center in the world.  No other location on earth, past or 
present, can match the global cultural influence that Hollywood and, by 
extension, California can lay claim to, if only in terms of the sheer number 
of people it reaches.  In addition to being the Mecca of the motion picture 
industry, California captures large swaths of the recording industry and is 
home to Silicon Valley, whose digital and high-tech advancements are 
employed by the film and television industries to create groundbreaking 
special effects and filming techniques that were simply impossible to do 
fifteen, perhaps just ten years ago.  California offers unmatched depths of 
talent.  Despite these advantages, continued hegemony is anything but 
certain. 
The importance of the motion picture industry to California’s 
economy, particularly that of Southern California, is critical.  In June 2009, 
the importance of the industry was driven home when the Los Angeles 
County Economic Development Corporation (LAEDC) reported the 
tourism and hospitality industry surpassed international trade as the number 
one generator of jobs in Los Angeles County.
201
  According to the LAEDC 
report, tourism and hospitality were responsible for 456,000 jobs in 2007, 
compared to 281,000 for international trade, which is significant since the 
port complex of Los Angeles and Long Beach is “the busiest port complex 
in the country.”
202
  Tourism in greater Los Angeles, according to The Los 
Angles Times, is centered around tourist destinations such as Grauman’s 
Chinese Theatre, Disneyland, Universal Studios and the Hollywood Walk 
of Fame.
203
 
 
 201. Hugo Martin, Tourism industry is L.A. County’s No. 1 job generator, report shows, 
L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at B1. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
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If the motion picture industry—and the entertainment industry in 
general—erodes in California, the draw of tourist attractions based on them 
could also wane.  Are attractions such as Hollywood’s Walk of Fame 
popular tourist attractions because they lie in the epicenter of Cultural 
Production (Hollywood, if not the World)?  If so, state lawmakers should 
consider whether such attractions would continue to draw tourists if (and 
perhaps, when) they become historical attractions of a bygone era rather 
than celebrations of Hollywood’s current preeminence. 
The symbiotic relationship between the entertainment industry and 
the tourism industry in California cannot be ignored; this is a fact that 
applies to California more than any other state in the U.S.  If production in 
other locations such as Vancouver, Toronto (Canada as a whole), 
Louisiana, or New Mexico declines, the impact on their respective tourism 
and hospitality industries would be negligible.  People visit New Orleans 
for the French Quarter, not because 2002’s Runaway Jury shot there.  Thus, 
California faces a unique threat to its other major industries on a scale 
unmatched by other filming locales. 
A.  The “Entertainment Capital of the World” is Under Siege 
The motion picture industry in California is under siege.  In 1997, 
employment in the “broader [film] industry” peaked at 174,000 jobs.
204
  
According to the Milken Institute, employment fell-off sharply after 1997 
and dipped below 135,000 in 2001; it has been recovering since then to a 
total of 167,000 in 2008.
205
  Using the same methodology the Milken 
Institute used to determine employment in California (NAICS codes 5121 
& 7115), the number of people employed in the motion picture industry in 
California fell to 152,905 in 2009 and increased slightly to 155,455 in 
2010.
206
  These employment numbers differ slightly from a 2011 report 
from the LAEDC, which claimed 159,291 people worked in the “[m]otion 
picture and video industries” in California.
207
  Unlike the Milken Institute, 
 
 204. KEVIN KLOWDEN ET AL., MILKEN INST., FILM FLIGHT: LOST PRODUCTION AND ITS 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CALIFORNIA 8 (2010).  The report also notes that: 
The BLS NAICS code for the motion picture and video industry is 5121; for 
independent artists, writers, and performers, it is 7115.  The motion picture and 
video industry category includes subcategories for movie and video production 
(NAICS 512110), motion picture and video distribution, motion picture 
theatres, teleproduction and post-production (NAICS 512191), and other motion 
picture and video industries. 
Id. at 35 n.16. 
 205. Id. at 7–8. 
 206. BLS DATA, supra note 18. 
 207. CHRISTINE COOPER ET AL., L.A. CNTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., CALIFORNIA FILM AND 
TELEVISION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: AN ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 3 (2011).  The report does 
not indicate which NAICS code it used. 
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however, the LAEDC does include “nonemployer” data to track the 
thousands of people who work as independent contractors as independent 
artists, writers and performers in the industry; in 2009 the number of people 
in this category was 69,129.
208
  In short, the total number of people 
employed in the motion picture industry in California is roughly 220,000-
230,000, depending on which NAICS codes are selected.
209
 
Important to bear in mind is Susan Christopherson’s finding that 
“core” industry workers, whose income derives entirely from the 
entertainment industry, “declined as a share of the total workforce, from 
38% in 1991 to 33% in 2002.”
210
  As the number of core workers as a 
percentage of the overall workforce decreased, so too did the influence of 
Hollywood’s labor unions: 
One common complaint is that producers attempting to cut 
costs will reduce shooting days by requiring overtime work from 
the production crew.  While long working hours are legendary in 
the media entertainment industry, the boundaries that 
circumscribed abuse appear to have broken down as unions have 
lost power over industry practices and with an increase in the 
proportion of productions made on ‘shoestring’ budgets.
211
 
B.  Is the Runaway Production Threat Overstated? 
In March 2011, the California Research Bureau (CRB), which had 
been tasked with assessing the damage, if any, to California from runaway 
production reported that, while feature film activity declined, it was offset 
by an increase in television production: 
At the beginning of the decade, feature films accounted for 
one-fifth of total PPDs, but only 15 percent in 2007, a 25 percent 
relative decline in share.  Television, which accounted for 23 
percent of the PPDs at the start of the decade, now takes more 
than 40 percent of the total. 
The decline in feature film PPDs may in part reflect 
competitive pressures for feature film production arising from 
other states and foreign countries in recent years.  However, 
those competing states’ subsidy programs do not explain the 
concomitant rises in television and other production shoots in the 
Los Angeles area.  In the aggregate, L.A. regional PPDs 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. BLS DATA, supra note 18. 
 210. Susan Christopherson, Labor: The Effects of Media Concentration on the Film and 
Television Workforce, in THE CONTEMPORARY HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY, 155, 157 (Paul 
McDonald & Janet Wasko eds., 2008) (emphasis in original). 
 211. Id. at 162. 
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averaged more than 52,400 per year during 2003-07, when other 
states were adopting motion picture incentive policies.  This 
compares to only 45,000 per year during 2000-02.
212
 
The language above (particularly the last two sentences), in 
addition to the CRB’s claim there had been “robust” employment growth 
since 2000, suggests runaway production has not caused significant 
damage, though it was still “unclear.”
213
  Before addressing the CRB’s 
discussion on the growth in television production, it is important to look at 
a major point it observed about declining wages in Los Angeles.  In 2000, 
industry workers in L.A. earned 27% more each month than non-L.A. 
industry workers, but by 2009, they earned 13% less: 
While industry employment in Los Angeles County grew over 
the decade, both in absolute terms and relative to movie industry 
employment in the rest of the state, the same has not been true for 
average monthly earnings.  Los Angeles County movie industry 
employees earned, on average, 27 percent more per month in 
2000 than their non-L.A. counterparts.  In 2009, the average L.A. 
county industry employee earned 13 percent less per month than 
his non-L.A. counterpart.  This was driven both by declining 
average wages in Los Angeles and rising average (nominal) 
wages in the rest of the state.  The causes of these shifts in 
relative wages within the state’s movie industry are beyond the 
scope of this brief.
214
 
While the CRB was correct about the growth in television 
production, it did not realize the explanation for declining wages laid in the 
television production statistics.  Most of the growth in television has been 
from the reality television category; in 2010, over 7,300 of the 17,833 
production days were for reality shows, the largest sub-type in the 
category.
215
  Reality programming is typically excluded from most 
incentive programs.  This could explain why they have been immune from 
runaway production.  Further, most reality shows are not unionized or 
staffed with union crews (who enjoy significant benefits like healthcare, 
pension, etc.), which means they pay substantially less and shoot for much 
shorter durations than other television categories, like the one-hour drama 
for example.  In effect, the productions that leave California (feature films, 
television series, movies of the week etc.) are the ones that spend the most 
 
 212. BRIAN R. SALA ET. AL., C.A. RESEARCH BUREAU, THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY IN 
CALIFORNIA: A BRIEF UPDATE 4–5 (2011). 
 213. Id. at 2–5. 
 214. Id. at 3. 
 215. FILML.A. INC., ON-LOCATION FILM PRODUCTION REPORT 2009–2010 2 (2011), 
http://www.filmla.com/data_reports.php (follow “On-Location Production, 2009–2010” 
hyperlink) [hereinafter FILML.A. 2009–2010 REPORT]. 
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money, employ the most people (often for longer durations), offer the best 
benefits, and pay the highest wages. 
Unfortunately, critics have misconstrued the on-location 
production numbers to paint a rosy production picture.  For example, a 
2004 report prepared by Neil Craig in Canada to counter allegations their 
film incentives were harming the U.S. economy noted that, while there was 
a significant drop in feature film activity, it was more than offset by 
“robust” growth in television; the report reasoned that because Canada 
historically captured more television work, harm from their film incentives 
would affect both categories rather than just features: 
There is no proof that “Canadian tax credits are responsible” 
for the decline in feature productions as claimed by some U.S. 
commentators.  It is important to observe that in the international 
production field, Canada has historically done more television 
work than feature films. 
In the six-year period reported, television production 
accounted for 53.7 percent of the total volume of U.S.-based 
international production in the country and that figure has risen to 
56.8 percent in the past two years.  Yet, television production 
activity in Hollywood appears to be robust.
216
 
The problem with this reasoning is that, like the CRB report, it fails to 
recognize that the growth in television production has been fueled, as 
mentioned above, by an explosion of reality television production.  In fact, 
the Craig report explicitly mentioned that Canada had not captured a 
significant share of reality television.
217
  Thus, the report’s clever argument 
is turned on its head since the one area of robust growth was in the category 
of reality television, which Canada was unable to attract.  In a 2005 report 
from the California Budget Project, the authors made the same mistake as 
the Craig report and said the data “suggest[s] that the industry is not in 
crisis.”
218
 
Runaway production is a very real and significant threat to 
California, and critics who have used data to suggest there has not been a 
problem have hampered countering this threat.  However, when properly 
analyzed, that same data does show the frightening reality that film 
incentives have caused a dramatic decline in runaway production. 
 
 216. NEIL CRAIG ASSOCS., INTERNATIONAL FILM & TELEVISION PRODUCTION IN CANADA 
26–27 (2004). 
 217. Id. at 11. 
 218. JEAN ROSS, C.A. BUDGET PROJECT, ARE REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS NEEDED TO 
SAVE CALIFORNIA’S FILM INDUSTRY? 2 (2005). 
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C. Devastating Declines Caused by Incentive Fueled Runaway 
Production: 
In July 2009, the Los Angeles Times reported location feature film 
production in the Los Angeles area dropped to the “lowest levels on 
record” and that California’s share of all U.S. feature film production 
dropped from 66% in 2003 to 31% in 2008: 
Student films generated as much activity on the streets of Los 
Angeles in the first quarter of 2009, when only a few movies, 
including “Fame” and “Alvin and the Chipmunks:  The 
Squeakquel,” were shot there. 
California’s share of U.S. feature film production dropped to 
31% in 2008 from 66% in 2003 . . . .
219
 
As seen in Chart 6,
220
 from 1997 to 2010, the number of permitted 
production days for feature films in the greater Los Angeles area decreased 
in all but three years, and the number of production days declined an 
astonishing 64% from 1996 to 2009, which was the worst year on record 
since tracking began.
221
 
 
CHART 6: 
 
 
 219. Richard Verrier, As the Hollywood machine abandons L.A., its supporting workers 
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The numbers for primetime television pilots filming in greater Los 
Angeles have also declined.  In the 2004-05 development cycle for pilots, 
101 of the 124 produced that cycle filmed in Los Angeles, which 
contributed $309 million to the local economy.
222
  In the 2008-09 
development cycle, California captured 59 of the 101 pilots produced, a 
42% decline from 2004-05, and production spending decreased to an 
estimated $207 million.
223
  The average cost to produce a pilot in 2008-09 
was between $3-5 million; the average pilot directly employs roughly 150 
people for the duration of the project.
224
 
In 2005, the California Employment Development Department 
(EDD) reported that motion picture industry employment grew in the “mid-
to-late 1990’s [and] began falling in 2000.”
225
  At the same time, motion 
picture employment in other states increased.
226
  In fact, the EDD reported 
that “the drop in employment in California from 1999 to 2003 (almost 
35,000 jobs) is virtually matched . . . by an almost 39,000 increase of jobs 
in all other states” for the same period.
227
  The EDD report was unable to 
place the blame for the decline squarely on runaway production, which 
“may have” been the cause: 
The downward trend in employment during this period may have 
been due to the effects of runaway production to other countries 
and other states, but it may also have been due to the national 
recession, or possibly to structural changes in the film industry.  
Pinpointing which of these factors, or combination of factors, that 
have produced this downward trend still eludes a definitive 
diagnosis.
228
 
In July 2009, the LAEDC released a report that, unlike the 2005 EDD 
report, was unequivocal in placing the blame for free falling production 
numbers on runaway production on other jurisdictions: 
[R]un-away production of feature films is a growing threat to 
the local economy.  Run-away production is not an ephemeral 
thing.  It represents lost jobs and tax revenues to the Los Angeles 
economy. . . . Production costs have become a major concern for 
broadcast TV networks, due to the weak advertising market.  
Thus, the incentives offered by other states are now starting to 
 
 222. FILML.A. INC., 2005–2009 TELEVISION PILOT PRODUCTION REPORT 4 (2010), 
http://www.filmla.com/data_reports.php (follow “TV Pilot Production, 2009” hyperlink). 
 223. Id. at 3–4. 
 224. Id. at 4. 
 225. C.A. EMP’T DEV. DEP’T, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE MOTION PICTURE 
INDUSTRY IN CALIFORNIA 18 (2005). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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lure more production of pilots out of the Los Angeles area.
229
 
In 2009, FilmL.A., a nonprofit group that tracks filming in the 
greater Los Angeles area, attributed the drop in production to runaway 
production and said California needed a competitive incentive program.
230
 
The June 2010 Milken report noted that the drops in employment 
and production that began in the late 1990’s can be attributed to tax 
incentives abroad, primarily Canada’s 1998 production tax subsidy: 
The falloff in the late 1990s coincides with a push by Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and Eastern Europe to build production 
facilities and cultivate local talent.  These locations began 
offering incentives for film production, and the enticements 
worked.  One study estimated that the total U.S. expenditure lost 
to runaway production was $2.8 billion in 1998.  This study also 
confirmed that most out-of-country production went to Canada, 
which lured film and television producers with NAFTA-exempt 
production incentives, including substantial tax rebates.  The 
Canadian production tax subsidy was passed in 1998, and within 
just a few years, the effect in California was notable.
231
 
Moreover, despite some recovery in California since 2001, the gains were 
meager compared to those of Louisiana and New Mexico.  The Milken 
report noted that incentives were once again to blame: 
Many productions returned to the United States after the turn of 
the millennium, as the euro and the Canadian dollar gained 
strength.  But not all the repatriating productions returned to 
Hollywood.  Other U.S. states had begun providing incentives 
and became viable competitors for movie production.  Looking at 
BLS numbers from 2003 to 2008, compound growth in 
employment for California’s industry was 2.3 percent, compared 
with a massive 45.8 percent jump in New Mexico and 24.8 
percent growth in Louisiana.
232
 
The Milken report said California could not afford to remain 
complacent and urged policymakers to take action to retain a vital industry: 
California no longer can afford to rest on its laurels or its storied 
entertainment industry pedigree.  Especially in the current 
economy, it’s imperative that policymakers understand what’s at 
 
 229. JACK KYSER ET AL., L.A. CTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., 2009–2010 MID YEAR UPDATE 
ECONOMIC FORECAST AND INDUSTRY OUTLOOK 70 (2009). 
 230. Press Release, FilmL.A. Inc., L.A Region’s On-Location Feature Filming in 
Freefall (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.filmla.com/news_releases.php?year=2009 (follow 
“Download PDF” hyperlink after “FilmL.A. Release 2005–2009 Television Pilot Production 
Report”). 
 231. KLOWDEN ET AL., supra note 204, at 9 (citation omitted). 
 232. Id. 
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stake and take decisive steps to retain an industry that serves as a 
vital source of jobs and revenue.  Leaders in the film industry 
will have to take an active role in effectively communicating this 
message.
233
 
According to the Milken report, had California managed to retain 
its share of employment enjoyed in 1997 (prior to the first significant 
incentives in Canada), the state could have preserved 10,600 direct industry 
jobs and 25,500 indirect jobs through 2008.
234
  The wages and economic 
output of these combined 36,000 jobs would have totaled $2.4 billion and 
$4.2 billion, respectively, in 2008 alone.
235
 
D.  Grass Root Efforts to Fight Runaway Production 
After the FTAC trade complaint was rejected in 2007, the grass 
roots activism from film industry workers seemed to fall apart.  Even 
before the complaint was rejected, many people working in the industry 
were already disillusioned and disengaged after promising incentive 
legislation in 2005 “ran into a buzz saw” in Sacramento.
236
 
In 2010, Cinematographer Ed Gutentag founded “Shoot Movies in 
California,” a grassroots organization of industry workers and concerned 
citizens committed to keeping production in California.
237
  The group’s 
Facebook page had to be expanded to several pages to accommodate the 
14,000 supporters.
238
  The group now maintains its own news blog and 
website, through which it sells t-shirts and posts videos about the 
importance of the movie industry to California.
239
  The emergence of the 
group proved that there was still some fight left in the industry, which was 
still largely disengaged, cynical and apathetic after years of failing to get 
the state to take action on runaway production. 
The significant division among industry activists about the best 
strategy hampers their ability to get the industry’s rank and file to unite in 
an effective grassroots effort to combat runaway production.  FTAC and its 
supporters claim that incentives offered in Canada are an illegal violation 
of trade laws and an odious form of “corporate welfare.”
240
  For FTAC, the 
 
 233. Id. at 1. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. LOS ANGELES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FILM INDUSTRY PROFILE OF 
LOS ANGELES/CALIFORNIA COUNTY 6 (2005) [hereinafter LAEDC PROFILE]. 
 237. Peter Caranicas, Groups Battle to Lure Filming to California, VARIETY (April 5, 
2010), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118017207?refcatid=1236. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Bobbi Murray, Canadian Bacon: Hollywood Fights Back on Runaway Production, 
LA WEEKLY, (Aug. 15, 2002), http://www.laweekly.com/content/printVersion/35350/. 
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opposition to using film incentives to fight runaway production is an 
unnecessary ideological roadblock.  FTAC’s own attorneys suggested the 
trade action against Canada would not endanger the existence of film 
incentives in the U.S.
241
  As a result, FTAC’s corporate welfare rhetoric 
caught on in California and contributed to the defeat of film incentive 
legislation in 2005: 
The Governor and the Speaker of the state assembly proposed 
an incentive package for low-budget films in late 2005, but it 
quickly ran into a buzz saw in Sacramento and was not passed.  
Opponents called it “corporate welfare” or fretted about state tax 
revenue going to an industry that has had accounting issues.  
Overlooked in the uproar were both the jobs and state tax 
revenues lost to a film being shot in another state.
242
 
The FTAC mentality has not abated, despite the defeat of their trade action.  
FTAC is no longer active on any meaningful level, but many current and 
former members continue to oppose film incentives for legitimate and valid 
reasons, such as the expensive race to the bottom.
243
  However, if FTAC 
wants to compete on a level playing field (and they do), the only way to 
level it is with a competing film incentive.  It does not make sense for 
FTAC to oppose an incentive in California to temporarily level the playing 
field while pursuing their push to eliminate foreign subsidies.  Finally, as 
will be discussed in the next section, the patchwork of state film incentives 
in the U.S. has been effective at reversing runaway production to Canada. 
E.  The California Film & Television Tax Credit 
In February 2009, state lawmakers surprised many when they 
included film incentives in a budget bill that provided $12 billion in tax 
increases and broke a budget impasse that had been stalled for three 
months.
244
  California’s action, however late, helped level the playing field 
with other states.  The incentive took effect on July 1, 2009, and provides 
for a five-year $500 million tax credit program; the program is capped at 
$100 million annually.
245
 
 
 
 241. Videotape: Will Filing a 301(a) Endanger Domestic Film Subsidies? (FTAC 2007), 
http://www.ftac.org/vid/05-301a-Filing-endanger-szFM.swf. 
 242. LAEDC PROFILE, supra note 236, at 6. 
 243. See Murray, supra note 240 (explaining that once production costs exceed a certain 
amount, producers ship jobs overseas to obtain better rebates and production incentives). 
 244. Sam Thielman & Dave McNary, Golden Carrot?, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 20, 2009, 
at 1 (describing how California’s film production tax incentive program is intended to draw 
producers back to California from New York). 
 245. Id. 
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TABLE 11: 
OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA FILM INCENTIVES
246
 
Incentive Eligible Productions247 Additional Requirements 
20% Tax 
Credit for 
“qualified 
motion 
pictures.” 
Feature films must spend at least 
$1,000,000 but not more than $75 
million. 
Movies of the Week or Miniseries 
must have a $500,000 minimum 
production budget. 
New television series licensed for 
original distribution on basic cable 
($1 million minimum budget); one 
half hour shows and other 
exclusions apply. 
A “qualified motion picture” must meet 
the following conditions: 
1) 75% test= Production days or total 
production budget in California 
2) Principal photography must commence 
no later than 180 days after application 
approval 
3) Post-production must be completed 
within 30 months of receiving tax credit 
application approval 
4) Copyright for the motion picture must 
be registered with US Copyright Office. 
“Qualified expenditures” are amounts 
expenditures paid or incurred for the 
purchase or lease of tangible personal 
property and qualified wages for services 
performed in California. 
Above the Line wages are not qualified 
expenditures:  writers, directors, music 
directors, music composers, music 
supervisors, producers and actors, other 
than background actors. 
25% Tax 
Credit for 
“qualified 
motion 
pictures.” 
A television series, without regard 
to episode length, that filmed all of 
its prior season or seasons outside 
of California. 
An “independent film” $1 million 
—$10 million budget that is 
produced by a company that is not 
publicly traded and that publicly 
traded companies do not own more 
than 25% of the producing 
company. 
 
The incentive did not impress everyone.  A May 2009 commentary 
in the Hollywood Reporter by entertainment and tax attorney Schuyler M. 
Moore pointed out some of the problems with the California’s film 
incentive: 
There is still so much production in California that the state can’t 
compete on equal footing in this tax-credit flea market, as even a 
modest credit applied to the massive remaining production in 
California would tip it into bankruptcy.  The best the state can do 
 
 246. ENTERTAINMENT PARTNERS, BASIC OVERVIEW OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 
PRODUCTION INCENTIVES 2–3 (2011), http://www.entertainmentpartners.com/Content/ 
Support/support_files/EP_IncentivesOverview.pdf; SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, CALIFORNIA 
FILM INCENTIVE POWER POINT PRESENTATION (2009), http://www.sag.org/california-film-
incentive-power-point-presentation. 
 247. The following types of production are not eligible for California’s incentives:  
commercials, awards, reality shows, music videos, news programs, current events or shows, 
productions that solicit funds, student films, industrial films, public affairs programs, talk 
shows, game shows, clip based programming (more than 50% of content is comprised of 
licensed footage), documentaries, sporting events, variety half hour episodic TV shows 
(sitcoms) programs, daytime dramas, adult films.  SCREEN ACTORS GUILD, supra note 246, 
at 3. 
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is pretend to compete, which is why it recently passed an anemic, 
deferred-production tax credit that looks good in news stories but 
in practice is a paper tiger.  And in most cases, the credit is 
unusable because it is not refundable and generally can only be 
used against the production company’s California tax liability, 
which often is zero.  Even when the credit can be used, it is 
deferred until 2011, and given California’s history of “gotcha!” 
tax changes and its current fiscal problems, it would not be 
surprising if California deferred further use of the tax credit “for 
a little longer.”
248
 
Moore’s analysis was prescient, if not understated.  Shortly after 
the incentive passed, producers of Deal or No Deal, the popular syndicated 
game show hosted by Howie Mandel, announced they were shifting 
production from Culver City, California, to Stamford, Connecticut, a state 
which offers a 30% production tax credit.
249
  Under California’s tax 
incentive program, only television series that are new or that had 
previously shot in other states are eligible.  Thus, Deal or No Deal, which 
filmed in Culver City since it aired in 2005, was ineligible for the incentive 
and most of the 250 people who work on the show will lose their jobs.
250
  
This begs the question:  would the show have stayed in California had it 
qualified for the incentive? 
Despite such problems and Moore’s cynicism, the film incentive 
has proven to be much more than a “paper tiger” and helped prevent what 
would have been the worst year on record for feature film activity.  In 
January 2011 FilmL.A. reported that feature film production in California 
increased 8.1% from 2009-2010, which can be attributed to film incentive 
productions: 
On-location Feature production posted a 28.1 percent fourth 
quarter gain and a year over-year gain of 8.1 percent (5,378 PPD 
in 2010 vs. 4,976 in 2009).  The annual increase can be wholly 
attributed to California’s Film and Television Tax Credit. . . . 
In 2010 alone, the State program attracted dozens of new 
feature film projects to Los Angeles, which were responsible for 
26 percent of local Feature production for the year (totaling 1,400 
PPD).  Were it not for these projects, 2010 would have been the 
worst year on record for on-location Feature filming in Los 
Angeles.  As it stands, that record is held by the year 2009, when 
the Features category finished 64 percent below its historical 
 
 248. Schuyler M. Moore, Could a Single Federal Tax Credit End the Economic War 
among the States?, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, May 29, 2009, at 9. 
 249. Richard Verrier, ‘Deal or No Deal’ Production is Shifting to Connecticut, L.A. 
TIMES, May 2, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/02/business/fi-ct-gameshow2. 
 250. Id. 
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peak (4,976 PPD in 2009 vs. 13,980 in 1996).
251
 
California’s film and television tax incentive program is not as 
generous or comprehensive as those of other states, but it is not 
insignificant.  Moore’s cynical claims and predictions about the modest 
California incentive have now been shown to be incorrect. 
What Moore and others fail to recognize is that California’s 
incentives do not have to be as competitive because the state has a 
tremendous home-field advantage:  Hollywood.
252
  The major studios have 
much, if not all, of their corporate operations in the greater Los Angeles 
area and maintain studios and production facilities in Los Angeles and 
Southern California.  Indeed, Hollywood’s infrastructure advantage is 
overwhelming.  In 2002, 69% of all digital and visual effects firms in the 
entire U.S. were located in Southern California.
253
  In terms of production 
space, soundstages and studio facilities in Los Angeles had a combined 
square footage of 5,049,000 in 2005.
254
  That is more production space than 
in New York, Chicago, Orlando, Vancouver and Toronto combined.
255
 
Because California has such a massive infrastructure system in 
place, it attracts the most talented workers in the professions servicing the 
motion picture industry:  Talented and veteran production crews with 
decades of experience.  Veteran actor Kirk Douglas said, “[m]y 
recollection is that no crew was as good as a Hollywood crew, no matter 
where they were.  There’s no argument that it is much easier to shoot a 
movie here.”
256
 
F.  The FilmWorks Campaign 
In December 2010, a coalition of industry stakeholders launched a 
public education campaign spearheaded by FilmL.A. called Film Works.
257
  
The goals of the campaign are to promote filming in Los Angeles and 
California, educate state residents about the economic importance and the 
benefits that the state receives from filming, and to aid the effort to fight 
runaway production.
258
  The Film Works campaign is significant because it 
 
 251. Press Release, FilmL.A. Inc., Q4 Gains Help On-Location Filming in L.A. Recover 
15% in 2010 (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.filmla.com/news_releases.php. 
 252. Hollywood is frequently used as the moniker for Los Angeles County or Southern 
California, as most of the major studios are not literally in the City of Hollywood anymore.  
Only Paramount is based in Hollywood.  Walt Disney and Warner Brothers are in Burbank, 
Sony is in Culver City and Universal is in Universal City. 
 253. SCOTT, supra note 21 at 98, 105. 
 254. Id. at 84. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Longwell, supra note 44, at 2–3. 
 257. FILM WORKS L.A., http://www.filmworksla.com/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 258. About, FILM WORKS L.A., http://www.filmworksla.com/about.aspx (last visited Oct. 
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is the first organized (as opposed to unfunded grassroots efforts of the past) 
campaign supported by the City and County of Los Angeles, the major 
industry unions (SAG, IATSE, etc.), local businesses and the major studios 
(Warner Bros. is one of the financial sponsors).
259
  Film Works’s aggressive 
advertising campaign in the Los Angeles region consisted of outdoor 
advertising, a web site and supporting blog, a social media presence 
(Facebook, Twitter, YouTube), and a public service announcement that 
will run in area movie theaters before films.
260
 
By August 2011, the Film Works blog had posted dozens of 
articles about runaway production, the damage other state film incentives 
are doing to the U.S. film industry, the effectiveness of using film 
incentives to prevent (rather than cause) runaway production, and profiles 
of California businesses impacted by the entertainment industry and 
runaway production.
261
  The Film Works blog caught the attention of the 
Washington, D.C.-based Tax Foundation, when it responded to testimony 
the Tax Foundation gave to the California State Assembly about the state’s 
film incentives and pointed out how the Tax Foundation’s opposition to 
film incentives was applicable to other states, not California.
262
  The 
Economist covered the Film Works response to the Tax Foundation’s 
testimony, indicating that the campaign was getting the message out to 
policymakers around the world who read the publication.
263
 
The Film Works campaign has responded to several editorials 
written in California.  In June 2011, an editorial in the Press Enterprise 
dismissed the need for a film incentive in the state and suggested that 
runaway production was not a concern:  “The Hollywood hullabaloo has 
been that other states have tax breaks that lure production away from 
California.  But California has a long-established entertainment industry 
that is unlikely to pick up and disappear.”
264
 
 
15, 2011). 
 259. Our Partners, FILM WORKS L.A., http://www.filmworksla.com/partners.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 260. News Room, FILM WORKS L.A., http://www.filmworksla.com/newsRoom.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2011); Press Release, Film Works L.A., Film Works L.A. Marketing 
Campaign Shifts Gears as Organizers Turn Their Attention to Educating Local 
Communities (Sep. 9, 2011), http://www.filmworksla.com/newsRoom.aspx. 
 261. Word Press, FILM WORKS L.A., http://filmworksla.wordpress.com/ (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2011). 
 262. Film Works Staff, Film Works Campaign Turning Heads Around the World, FILM 
WORKS UPDATE: NEW CAMPAIGN VIDEO DEBUTS & OTHER CAMPAIGN NEWS (July 25, 2011), 
http://filmworksla.wordpress.com/2011/07/25/film-works-update-new-campaign-video-
debuts-other-capaign-news/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Editorial, Tax-break Fantasy, PRESS ENTERPRISE (June 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.pe.com/localnews/opinion/editorials/stories/PE_OpEd_Opinion_D_op_13_ed_fi
lmtaxbreaks.1fb47b4.html. 
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Fearing that many in California were unaware that runaway 
production was a major problem already relocating the industry, Film 
Works offered a harsh response, warning that “California’s complacency” 
had “caused immense damage”:
265
 
What about the aerospace industry in California?  The auto 
industry in Detroit?  The steel industry in Pittsburgh and 
Pennsylvania?  Shortly after World War II, half of all 
manufactured goods sold on the planet were made in the U.S., 
but try telling that to the industry workers in China who produce 
over 70% of all products sold in Wal-Mart stores.  It’s time The 
Press-Enterprise had a reality check.  California’s complacency, 
believing it will always be the entertainment capital of the world, 
caused immense damage while the state took no action to address 
incentive-fueled runaway production from its start in the late 
1990′s until 2009.  Allowing further complacency to stand could 
prove fatal for an industry that paid California residents over $15 
billion in wages in just 2008.  The film and television industry 
has, is, and will continue to “pick up and disappear” if California 
fails—as it has in the past—to act.
266
 
The campaign’s response also assembled some of the sobering facts and 
figures highlighting the damage caused by runaway production: 
 In 2003, over 66 percent of studio feature films were shot 
in California.  By 2010, that number had dropped to less 
than 40 percent. 
 In the last 15 years, the number of on-location shooting 
days for feature films in the Los Angeles area dropped 
nearly 65 percent, according to FilmL.A. 
 In 2005, California captured 82% of all television pilot 
production activity.  In 2011, however, it captured just 
51%. 
 In 2000, Los Angeles County film industry workers 
earned 27% more per month than their non-L.A. 
counterparts.  By 2009, after a decade of unabated 
runaway production of high-budget films and shows 
(which offer the high-paying jobs), L.A.-based industry 
workers earned 13 percent LESS per month than their 
counterparts elsewhere, according to the California 
Research Bureau. 
 
 265. The Press-Enterprise—Where Fiction Masquerades as Fact, FILM WORKS L.A. 
(July 21, 2011), available at http://filmworksla.wordpress.com/2011/06/21/the-press-
enterprise-where-fiction-masquerades-as-fact/. 
 266. Id. 
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 From 1996 to 2009, the number of Californians 
employed in the high-skill and high-wage visual effects 
industry declined over 30% as jurisdictions elsewhere 
used targeted visual effects incentives to capture the 
industry from the state. 
 According to the Milken Institute, since Canada enacted 
the first tax credit program in 1997, now copied in 
roughly 40 states and dozens of nations, California has 
lost 36,000 jobs as a result.
267
 
G.  Fighting Fire With Fire: Using Film Incentives to Stop Runway 
Production 
The impact of the tax incentive has been dramatic.  Due to the way 
the law was crafted, the California Film Commission was allowed to 
allocate $200 million, if needed, in the first year of the program.  In that 
period (2009-10) $176 million in tax credits were allotted to seventy 
productions, which had an “estimated aggregate direct spending” total of 
$1.2 billion ($453 million for wages, $776 million in non-wage 
spending).
268
  The number of direct jobs from these seventy productions 
was estimated at 18,200 for crew members and 4,000 cast members with an 
additional 113,000 individuals hired as day-players or background extras.
269
  
For the 2010-11 program year, the $100 million allocated for the year “sold 
out” the day productions were allowed to apply (July 1, 2010); a total of 
forty-three productions received the allocated funding available.
270
  These 
forty-three productions are estimated to have “aggregate direct spending” 
of $969 million, $275 million of which to pay for an estimated 7,200 crew 
members and 2,500 cast members in addition to 59,000 day-players or 
background extras.
271
 
The combined economic impact of all projects described above for 
2009-11, which qualified for $300 million in credits available as of July 1, 
2010, is estimated at $2.2 billion in direct spending by the productions 
($728 million of which was for wages to residents).
272
  Applying a 
conservative multiplier of 2.95 for the motion picture industry in 
California, the California Film Commission estimated the $2.2 billion in 
direct spending would have an economic impact of an additional $6.5 
 
 267. Id. 
 268. CAL. FILM COMM’N, CALIFORNIA FILM & TELEVISION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: 
PROGRESS REPORT, 1–2 (2011), http://www.stop-runaway-production.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2009/07/Tax-Credit-FINAL-Hearing-Packet.pdf. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 3. 
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billion in “business revenues,” project earnings for qualified productions of 
an estimated $1.8 billion and a total of 40,996 full time equivalent (FTE) 
jobs just on the qualified productions alone.
273
  Unlike other states with 
incentives, however, California can expect to be the beneficiary of virtually 
all of the spending from these projects since the overwhelming 
infrastructure of the entire U.S. motion picture industry is housed within its 
borders. 
In June 2011, the LAEDC released an economic impact study of 
the California film incentive, which was funded by the MPAA.
274
  Given 
the inherent bias issues that have caused questionable findings in other 
MPAA-commissioned reports discussed earlier, the LAEDC report was 
suspect, unjustly or not, because of the MPAA’s questionable history.  That 
said, bias alone did not discredit the other reports, they were discredited for 
their substance (like the flawed tourism survey in the New Mexico report). 
Given this virtually universal finding for state film incentive 
programs from New Mexico to Louisiana to Massachusetts, how can the 
results for California be so different?  As discussed earlier, the history of 
the industry being based so densely in California for decades meant that 
virtually everything Hollywood needed to make a production can be found 
wholly within its own borders allowing for 92% of all production expenses 
in 2009 to be sourced within the state.
275
 
Thus, unlike other states where much of the production 
spending goes to out-of-state workers or businesses, California 
does not have a leakage problem thanks to the Hollywood home-
field advantage.  In addition, the report lists four specific reasons 
California’s film incentive is much more cost effective, relative to 
other states’ programs: 
First, the economy of California is large and diversified, 
allowing households and businesses to obtain most of the goods 
and services they need within the state, meaning there is less 
leakage of purchases out of the state and the dollars circulate 
within the state. 
Second, the motion picture and video industry itself is 
complex and comprehensive in California  Because the supply 
linkages are well-established, the industry can find all production 
facilities and requirements within the state, although lower costs 
elsewhere can impel the purchase of goods and services from 
outside of California. 
 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Email from Christine Cooper, Ph.D., Director, Econ. & Policy Analysis Grp., to 
author (June 29, 2011, 15:41 PDT) (on file with author) (explaining the methodology used 
by Dr. Cooper, the report’s author, to estimate the economic impacts of tax incentives). 
 275. LAEDC ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY, supra note 25, at 3. 
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Third, the California tax incentives are less generous than 
those offered in other states—in some cases, substantially less.  
With a deep talent base and skilled workers at all levels and 
stages of production, and a full range of supporting infrastructure 
and companies, California does not need to offer incentives 
above those (or even equal to those) offered by other states.  
Instead, smaller incentives that keep California “in the game” can 
be sufficient, as suggested by the response to the current 
program. 
Fourth, California’s steeply progressive income tax gives the 
state the ability to recoup its tax credit quickly.  Similarly, 
California’s high sales tax rate will generate more revenue from 
taxes on household purchases than states with lower sales 
taxes.
276
 
Also making California’s film incentive more efficient and cost 
effective is the fact that above-the-line expenditures generate economic 
activity but do not qualify for the credit: 
A close inspection of the production budgets and impact results 
shows that the overriding factor influencing this rate of return is 
the proportion of the budget that is spent above-the-line.  Above-
the-line spending generates economic activity but does not 
qualify for consideration under the tax credit program, so in 
essence this spending comes at no cost to the state.
277
 
As for the methodology, the study estimated the economic impact 
of the first seventy-seven productions approved for the initial tax credit 
allocation of $198.8 million for 2009-10 and 2010-11.
278
  The study’s 
authors examined the budgets of nine productions of differing size and type 
and extrapolated the findings to the broader group of incentivized projects: 
For every $1 million in qualifying expenditures, the nine 
productions will generate $3.9 million in economic output and 
support 21 jobs with labor income of $1.4 million.  Each $1 
million of qualifying expenditures will result in $207,100 in state 
and local taxes . . . . 
 The total qualifying expenditures for all 77 productions is 
$970.3 million.  Extrapolating from the results of our sample of 
productions, we estimate that the full slate of qualifying 
productions will generate more than $3.8 billion in economic 
output in California and support 20,040 jobs with labor income 
 
 276. Id. at 7. 
 277. Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). 
 278. Id. at 7. 
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of almost $1.4 billion.  Total state and local tax revenues are 
estimated to reach $201 million.
279
 
Bottom line, the LAEDC report claimed the incentive program was 
generative revenue: 
For every tax credit dollar approved under California’s Film and 
Tax Credit program, at least $1.13 in tax revenue will be returned 
to state and local governments.  This impact is based on 2 
components:  (i) $1.06 per tax credit dollar in initial economic 
impact; and (ii) 7¢ per tax credit dollar from ancillary 
production.
280
 
Even with the thorough, detailed and—most importantly—truthful and 
accurate explanation of why California’s incentive is vastly more effective 
than competing incentives in places like Louisiana, Georgia, etc., claiming 
the incentive makes more money than it costs was misleading. 
Since California’s film incentive, like any other state incentive, is 
funded with state tax revenue rather than local tax revenue, the program is 
not “paying for itself” in terms of returning to the State’s tax coffers an 
equal amount as allocated.  The report itself does not break down the 
source of the revenue.  When asked what portions of the revenue were from 
state taxes versus local, the report’s lead author said a detailed breakdown 
was not available, but the “ballpark” estimate was 2/3 state, 1/3 local.
281
  Of 
the numerous reports about the cost-benefit of various state film incentive 
programs I have seen, California’s incentive is the only one that comes 
close to breaking even.  The report does not include a balanced budget 
analysis to account for the opportunity cost of the program, but given the 
size and importance of the industry to the state, it seems unlikely using the 
funds for another purpose would yield a better return. 
Because of the importance of the report and its ability to influence 
California lawmakers considering an extension of the incentive, I sent an 
advance copy of the study to Robert Tannenwald and asked for his 
feedback.
282
  With the exception of a short paragraph about Tannenwald’s 
preference for an economic modeling program (REMI) not used in the 
report (which was IMPLAN), Tannenwald’s response was as follows: 
Apparently LAEDC has assumed that every film claiming the 
credit would have been produced outside of California in the 
credit’s absence.  While that might be a reasonable assumption 
for another state, I question its validity for California (or New 
 
 279. Id. at 9–10. 
 280. Id. at i. 
 281. Email from Christine Cooper to author, supra note 274. 
 282. Email from Robert Tannenwald, Senior Fellow, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities 
to author (July 6, 2011, 07:33 PDT) (on file with author). 
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York).  I assume (reasonably, I think) that a good number of 
California producers who planned to shoot their film in 
California anyway grabbed available credits.  I could be wrong, 
since I am not familiar with the details of California’s credit.  
But, if a condition for receiving the credit is that the production 
would have taken place in another state, I don’t know how the 
state could enforce it (except for TV productions—they had to 
have been produced previously in another state). 
There’s a phrase on page 10, “After adjusting for the temporal 
mismatch between the spending and tax credit realization.”  
LAEDC explains that it is adjusting for the time between 
production occurs and tax credits are awarded.  This is a strength 
of the study. 
I think that the multiplier for film spending in California 
would be higher than it would be in other states, as Los Angeles 
has such a strong media cluster.  However, above-the-line 
workers skilled in some aspect of film production, who travel to 
another state for a film, still spend most of their compensation 
back in California.  LAEDC acknowledges that the economic 
benefit of retained productions are concentrated in “above the 
line” workers.  These workers pay income tax to California rather 
than to some other state if the production is retained in 
California, true.  But, even if filming in another state, much of 
the income earned by above the line workers gets spent in 
California (above their per diem allowance).  It is not clear that 
LAEDC’s analysis takes this into account. 
I have to acknowledge, overall, that film retention in 
California has a larger payoff than film acquisition by another 
state.  Just not sure the tax credit pays for itself. 
Overall, except for the absence of a balanced budget analysis, 
not a bad study.
283
 
Since Tannenwald authored the leading report criticizing film 
incentives, his comments above seem like high praise and should help 
insulate the report from unfair criticism because of who paid for it.  If 
Tannenwald were unable to discredit the report, its credibility should not be 
in doubt.  It is unfortunate the MPAA paid for this particular report, 
because the structure of California’s incentive, combined with the 
concentration of the entertainment industry in the state, meant that 
California was perhaps the only place where a competitive film incentive 
might come close to breaking even. 
 
 283. Id. 
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Indeed, in 2005, the LAEDC predicted the California film 
incentive “would probably have paid for itself” after a film incentive bill 
almost identical to the current program was defeated earlier that year.
284
  
And that prediction was not from a report paid for by the MPAA or anyone 
else.  Had the LAEDC generated the 2011 report on its own initiative or at 
the request of the state, it would have been a vindication of their prediction, 
which would only bolster what is already an impeccable reputation.  The 
MPAA’s involvement could only be a negative that could diminish the 
value of the report and its findings at a critical time for extending a film 
incentive program that has been a very effective defense, if not the only 
available defense, against incentive fueled runaway production. 
VII.  CANADA 
With over forty states offering substantial film incentives in 2010, 
the obvious question is:  has the cumulative effect the state incentives 
stopped or slowed runaway production to other nations, primarily Canada? 
Based solely on the number of U.S. productions shot in Canada (either 
entirely or partially), the evidence is inconclusive.  The table below (Table 
12) shows that the number of total projects did increase after the first major 
tax incentives took effect in the late 1990’s and hit a high of 241 in 2000-
01, but the sharp two-year increase was followed by a an even sharper drop 
that bottomed out with ninety-three productions in 2004 before recovering 
to 165 in 2007-08 and falling to 139 in 2009-10. 
 
TABLE 12:  
U.S. FILMS PRODUCED IN CANADA 
YEAR  U.S. 
PROJECTS285, 286 
1998/99 175 
1999/00 229 
2000/01 241 
2001/02 169 
2002/03 159 
2003/04 93 
2004/05-2006/07 N/A 
 
 284. LAEDC PROFILE, supra note 236, at 6. 
 285. See DEP’T. OF CAN. HERITAGE, STUDY OF THE DECLINE OF FOREIGN LOCATION 
PRODUCTION IN CANADA 1, 3 (2005) (listing the number of U.S. productions filmed in 
Canada between 1998 and 2004). 
 286. See CAN. MEDIA PROD. ASS’N, PROFILE 2010: AN ECONOMIC REPORT ON THE 
CANADIAN FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION INDUSTRY 1, 84 (2010) (listing the number of 
U.S. productions filmed in Canada between 2007 and 2010) [hereinafter CANADIAN FILM 
PROFILE 2010]. 
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2007/08 165 
2008/09 158 
2009/10 139 
 
It is much more important to look at spending totals by foreign 
productions, rather than the number of them.  The chart below (Chart 7) 
shows the total amount of all foreign location spending in Canada at the 
national level, which increased substantially after the first significant film 
incentive took effect in 1998.
287
  Spending for all foreign production 
activity peaked in 2002-03 at $1.9 billion and has struggled to approach 
that high again.
288
 
 
CHART 7: 
 
 
In 2009, the Canadian Department of Cultural Heritage speculated 
that the rise in value of the Canadian dollar compared to the U.S. dollar 
could have contributed to the first decline in foreign production spending, 
but not the second, which was “cushioned” by incentive modification: 
The total volume of FLS (Foreign Location Spending) production 
dropped sharply in 2004/05, one year after the Canadian dollar 
started to rise in value from below 70 U.S. cents.  However, 
Canada’s volume of FLS production did not fall any further after 
2004/05, even as the Canadian dollar rose by another 20 U.S. 
cents to close to parity with the U.S. dollar.  The fact that most 
provincial and territorial governments moved quickly to modify 
 
 287. Id. at 83; CAN. MEDIA PROD. ASS’N, PROFILE 2009: AN ECONOMIC REPORT ON THE 
CANADIAN FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION INDUSTRY, 1, 79 (2009), [hereinafter 
CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 2009]. 
 288. CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 2009, supra note 287, at 77; CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 
2010, supra note 286, at 83. 
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their respective funding support programs appears to have helped 
cushion the rise of the Canadian dollar to some extent.  As well, 
it would appear that Canada’s numerous purpose-built studios, 
quality crews and proven track record of delivering films on-time 
and on-budget have allowed it to develop into more than just a 
low-cost location for Hollywood production.
289
 
Data contained in the 2010 Department of Canadian Heritage 
economic report on the Canadian film industry revealed the amount of 
foreign location spending on feature films specifically (as opposed to all 
productions) in Canada increased after two years of steep declines.  The 
first decline, shown in the chart below (Chart 8), occurred between 2004 
and 2005, when foreign spending on feature film production in Canada 
dropped from over $1.1 billion to $789 million.
290
  From 2005 to 2006, 
foreign location spending for feature film rebounded to $1 billion, but then 
dropped again, to $742 million, the next year.
291
  Foreign location spending 
by foreign feature films increased to just over $1 billion from 2007 to 2008, 
but fell again over the next two years to well under $700 million each 
year.
292
 
 
CHART 8: 
 
 
However, data for feature film spending before 2002 is not available.  
Employment for foreign location production in Canada, as shown in the 
 
 289. CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 2009, supra note 287, at 78. 
 290. CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 2010, supra note 286, at 83. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
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chart
293
 below (Chart 9), saw dramatic gains after it enacted it film 
incentives in the late 1990s and peaked at 53,900 in 2002 before an overall 
decline to 35,900 in 2009-10.  The peak year, 2002, was the same year 
New Mexico and Louisiana enacted the first significant incentives in the 
U.S., which rapidly expanded each year to over 44 states in 2010. 
 
CHART 9: 
 
 
Based on available information, an evaluation on the impact of 
U.S. film incentives on Canada is starting to become more and more 
conclusive.  Film incentives in the U.S. are impacting production activity, 
employment and the amount of foreign location spending in Canada to 
almost the same levels they were at when it enacted its first significant 
incentives in the late 1990s.  When Canada distorted the playing field in the 
late 1990s with significant film incentives, it saw spectacular gains.  Even 
if the gains of the past could be partly attributed to currency fluctuations, 
this is no longer the case.  Canada has been willing to adjust its incentives 
not because it is trying to compensate for currency, but because it wants to 
compete with various tax incentives of American states: 
Although the Canadian dollar remained high by historical 
standards in 2008/09 and 2009/10, and other jurisdictions—
particularly American states with their own tax incentives—
continued to provide competition to Canadian provinces and 
territories, the volume of FLS production in Canada recovered 
 
 293. CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 2010, supra note 286, at 81; CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 
2009, supra note 287, at 79. 
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slightly from the previous year.  FLS production fell by 18.4% to 
$1.4 billion in 2008/09, but recovered by 4.4% in 2009/10 to 
reach a total of $1.5 billion.
294
 
State film incentives in the U.S. have shown that when the playing 
field is leveled with Canada, the U.S. wins.  The problem, however, is that 
the current incentive scheme is completely unsustainable.  Once states 
realize—or are forced to accept—that they cannot afford to relocate 
Hollywood from Hollywood, they will end their incentives, and Canada 
and other nations will still be capable of competing with a weakened 
Hollywood, hollowed out from corrosive competition within the United 
States. 
VIII. ONE NATION, ONE FILM INCENTIVE: A WORKABLE SOLUTION TO 
RUNAWAY PRODUCTION 
When I started writing about runaway production in 2005, I framed 
it as a national concern.  Runaway production was leaving the United 
States for international locations.  Canada was the primary destination 
because of its proximity, cultural similarities and (for a time) a favorable 
exchange rate.  Other popular destinations included South Africa, 
Australia, New Zealand, Romania, Hungary, and the United Kingdom.  At 
that time, the U.S. retained two potential weapons to fight runaway 
production to Canada and elsewhere:  a trade action in the hopes foreign 
film incentives would be declared illegal and the enactment of competing 
film incentives in the U.S. to “fight fire with fire.”  In 2007, a trade 
complaint was filed with the United States Trade Representative.
295
  The 
United States Trade Representative considered and rejected the 
complaint.
296
 
In 2011, there was a development in Europe that could breathe new 
life into the argument favoring filing trade actions against Canada.  In June 
2011, the European Commission launched “a public consultation as the 
first step of a review of the criteria used to apply EU state aid rules to 
Member States’ financial support for making and distributing films.”
297
  In 
the accompanying issue paper, the European Commission noted that, while 
European Union member film incentives may lure films to Europe, they 
also result in a subsidy race that contradicts treaty objectives: 
 
 294. CANADIAN FILM PROFILE 2010, supra note 286, at 79. 
 295. Press Release, Statement from Gretchen Hamel, Deputy Assistant USTR for Public 
and Media Affairs, regarding a Section 301 Petition on Canadian Film Subsidies, Office of 
the United States Trade Representative, supra note 75. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Commission consults on support to 
film sector (June 20, 2011), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference 
=IP/11/757&type=HTML. 
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Major US-financed films have an average production budget 
of $65 million (€46million), with the most expensive films 
exceeding $200 million (€141 million).  This is many times 
higher than those of typical European productions.  While 
attracting them with subsidies may ensure that these high profile 
films are made in Europe rather than elsewhere, such subsidies 
distort competition among European production locations.  In 
these cases, the question is not whether the film will be produced 
but only where this will be done. 
To the extent that this use of public subsidies in effect leads to 
competition with other Member States, this is detrimental both to 
the sector and to European taxpayers.  It was not envisaged when 
the original State aid rules for promoting the European 
cinematographic culture were designed.  Avoiding subsidy races 
is precisely one of the objectives of the State aid provisions of 
the Treaty.
298
 
The European Commission plans to complete its review by the end 
of 2012.  Regrettably, the only remaining option for preventing runaway 
production in the U.S. is the “fight fire with fire” approach.  This is not to 
say another trade action complaint couldn’t be filed.  It may be more 
advantageous to wait and see what action the European Commission takes 
first, however, before filing with the United States Trade Representative 
again.  A finding that film incentives violate trade law in the EU may offer 
a stronger case to present to the USTR. 
When the “fight fire with fire” approach was discussed, it was 
intended to be employed at the national level to avoid the foreseeable 
dangers of a race to the bottom: 
While record Federal deficits may make it politically difficult 
to support the idea of a Federal Incentive for production, there 
are many compelling reasons it should be considered as it would 
it would allow the U.S. to regain a competitive position in the 
global market for production.  Based on a number of 
considerations, including those below, there is a reasonable basis 
to believe that a U.S. Federally-based program would quite 
effective. . . .  
In the world today, globalization is an economic fact of life.  
Companies across the world are seeking lower costs of 
manufacturing, distribution and operations.  The growth of 
foreign production of U.S. originated entertainment product, 
 
 298. Issues Paper on Assessing State Aid for Films and Other Audiovisual Works, at 6 
(2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_state_aid_films 
/issues_paper_en.pdf (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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however, seems, to a significant measure, to be driven by 
economic subsidies to producers as a conscious decision by 
countries seeking well-paying jobs in a clean industry. 
The question is [sic] with any job leaving the U.S. is, where 
and when does it stop.  When Canada was proposing their federal 
incentive their rallying call was, “these are the jobs your children 
want.”  The U.S. must decide it [sic] they want feature film 
production careers for their children, and their children’s 
children.
299
 
In order for the “fight fire with fire” approach to work in stemming 
or stopping runaway productions from leaving the country, the purpose of a 
competing incentive in the U.S. needs to be preventing runaway production 
from the nation’s borders—not causing it within them.  Other countries are 
waging economic warfare on the U.S., and rather than fight back, we have 
been fighting with ourselves. 
With the exception of California and New York, the other states 
enacted film incentives to cause runaway production, not prevent it.  As 
each new state got in the incentive game to cause runaway production for 
selfish gain, the inevitable race to the bottom ensued. 
The “United States” is anything but when it comes to preserving 
one of the last great American industries we have left.  A national problem 
demands a national solution.  Rather than acting in the national interest, 
states with film incentives designed to cause runaway production are acting 
only in self-interest. 
Some good has come out of the race to the bottom.  Collectively, the 
state incentive programs served as a de facto national incentive for the 
United States.  As discussed above, this offers convincing evidence that a 
national incentive is, in fact, a solution to runaway production. 
In May 2009, Schuyler M. Moore proposed a basic national incentive 
scheme: 
So what’s the solution?  Easy.  It is time for all the states to 
band together, stop the self-defeating madness and request the 
federal government to convert Section 181 into a useful 10% tax 
credit—instead of a deduction—for U.S. production costs.  And 
it must be assignable in order to provide actual financing for 
production, which is what really is needed. 
As part of implementing this tax credit, the federal 
government should use its power under the Commerce Clause to 
pre-empt all state laws (and don’t let Puerto Rico sneak away) 
that give tax credits for production.  That way, the states would 
be saved from their self-inflicted immolation, and they could go 
 
 299. Katz, supra note 81, at 73–75. 
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back to competing for production based on services, 
infrastructure and locations—just like in the good ol’ days.  We 
could go back to seeing ads to shoot in Wyoming because of its 
sweeping vistas rather than ads for shooting in Connecticut 
because of its sweeping tax credits.
300
 
A national incentive could model itself on the California model, 
which confirms the incentive does not need to meet or beat the competition.  
If the jurisdiction has a mature and robust industry infrastructure, the 
argument that film incentives will always need to be increased for the 
jurisdiction to stay competitive is simply not true.  The U.S. has Hollywood 
and New York, and U.S. studios account for nearly 60% of the 
international box office.
301
  On a level playing field, the U.S. not only 
competes, it dominates the planet. 
The genius of a national incentive is its simplicity.  For a fraction 
of the price the nation is now paying via the multiple state incentives, the 
U.S. could achieve the same goal.  The political reality, however, of having 
such a plan realized at the national level is, like the movies, an unlikely 
fiction.  Many of the states with aggressive film incentive programs would 
not want to lose their advantage.  Certainly, with a national production 
incentive plan in place, it is likely that most film and television production 
in the U.S. would return to the traditional bases of California and New 
York.  States like Louisiana, New Mexico, Michigan and others are certain 
to oppose losing whatever gains they think, perhaps naively, they have 
made. 
Nevertheless, an appeal that frames runaway production as a 
national problem requiring a national solution by arguing that the state film 
incentive “solution” to runaway production is actually exacerbating the 
problem by eroding the massive industry clusters in the nation:  California 
and New York.  Sadly, this point is overshadowed by the claims made by 
film backers about job creation in their respective states and the national 
employment statistics that show the nation is not losing jobs to Canada as a 
result. 
Preventing runaway production is about much more than protecting 
jobs in the U.S., it is about protecting a vital national industry.  Hollywood 
needs to be thought of as a high-value natural resource.  The U.S. is blessed 
in ways most Americans do not appreciate:  Hollywood is a natural 
resource valued throughout the entire world, and the U.S. has almost 
exclusive possession of the means to producing it.  Hollywood’s 
 
 300. Moore, supra note 248. 
 301. See Phil Hoad, The Rise of the International Box Office, GUARDIAN FILM BLOG 
(Aug. 11, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/filmblog/2011/aug/11 
/hollywood-international-box-office (discussing the increasing role the international movie 
market plays in film production). 
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domination of the global entertainment industry is so lopsided and 
beneficial to the U.S. because of this concentration.  It can be likened to the 
benefit OPEC member nations reap from the concentration of another 
natural resource:  oil.  Oil, however, is a natural resource that cannot be 
relocated to benefit another location through the use of economic policy 
like tax incentives.  Even by force, if another nation wanted to be the sole 
beneficiary of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves, they would still have to occupy 
Saudi Arabia to pump the oil.  Hollywood is a moveable natural resource. 
Many Americans fear the U.S. is a nation in decline and worry that 
the world’s last remaining superpower is becoming a second-rate nation.  
One way for Americans to help stop this decline is to protect Hollywood, 
one of America’s few remaining strengths.  For now, the U.S. enjoys 
complete supremacy in a very valuable global industry, the motion picture 
and television industry referred to across the planet as “Hollywood.” 
In 2010, U.S. films accounted for 60% of the global box office.
302
  
In important economic regions, like the European Union, that number is 
even higher.  In fact, U.S. films account for an average of 70% of the entire 
E.U. box office and, in certain member nations, that percentage is even 
higher.
303
  Additionally, the U.S. share of the E.U. home video market is 
equally high, exceeding 70%.
304
  Conversely, the market share of foreign 
language films at the U.S. box office is, at one half of one percent, 
practically non-existent.
305
 
Framing the issue as a matter of economic warfare that is damaging 
the national economy may also resonate with politicians reluctant to take 
up a “Hollywood” concern.  If the nation is under economic attack, it needs 
a national response.  We don’t rely on the individual state guards to protect 
the entire nation from external threats, and this should not be any different.  
Policymakers in Canada knew exactly how and where to hit.  In 2005, for 
example, the Director General of the Canadian Department of Heritage told 
Canada’s National Parliament that the tax credit system was a “simple and 
efficient system” of attracting foreign productions, and if Canada wanted to 
attract more, they “would just have to give a 50 per cent tax credit on labor, 
and nothing would be filmed in Hollywood, everything would happen 
here.”
306
  If statements like this are not considered a direct threat to a 
national industry worth taking defensive action to prevent, then what is? 
There are signs Canada knows it cannot sustain the ongoing race to 
the bottom.  For example, in 2007, a Toronto Film Office report claimed 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Issues Paper, supra note 298, at 3. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 33 (1999) 
(explaining how the growth of multiplexes caused the decline of foreign films in the U.S.). 
 306. 24 Feb. 2005, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2008)(Can.). 
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the race to the bottom is one they did not “want to win” because it is also 
one they “can’t win”:
307
 
There is a race to the bottom going on worldwide to establish 
Booniewoods around the globe.  This is a race Toronto doesn’t 
want to win. 
Within North America our success has been successfully 
copied.  Even though the provincial government raised the 
Ontario tax credit in 2005 to try and fend off the competition, the 
competition simply raised its credits higher.  The race to the 
higher tax credit is another one we can’t win.
308
 
Similarly, in 2008, the provincial government in British Columbia warned 
the province that “at some point” it may be “either unable or unwilling to 
match” incentives:
309
 
The big budgets and the ancillary benefits of having a 
blockbuster Hollywood production film in a particular location 
have spawned many imitators of Canada’s tax credit strategy.  As 
a result, the incentives available to film and television producers 
have become more lucrative as each region tries to one-up the 
other. 
At some point, British Columbia may be either unable or 
unwilling to match another region’s incentives, which could 
leave BC’s film production industry with a shortage of foreign 
productions wanting to film in the province.
310
 
As mentioned earlier, because of the response to the California Film & 
Television Tax Credit, the LAEDC found California did not even need to 
top—or even match—those offered in other locations because of its deep 
talent base and infrastructure.
311
  Similarly, New York’s program, which is 
also meant to prevent runaway production and shares California’s modest 
limitations, has proven the same thing: 
New York’s most serious competitors offer programs with 
unlimited funding, no sunset, more generous incentives, and 
broader eligibility of qualifying costs, such as actors’, producers’ 
and directors’ fees.  The difference can mean producers can get 
anywhere from 7 percent to 24 percent more in credit in states 
 
 307. TORONTO FILM BD., BOUNCE BACK TO FAST FORWARD: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 
TORONTO’S SCREEN-BASED INDUSTRY 26 (2007). 
 308. Id. 
 309. Call of the Loonie: American Film & Television Productions Shun BC in 2007,  BC 
STATS: EXPORTS, Feb. 2008, at 4.   
 310. Id. 
 311. LAEDC ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY, supra note 25, at 7. 
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such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Michigan.  Despite this 
intense competition, however, the past year has demonstrated that 
when funded at an adequate level New York can remain 
extremely competitive in attracting production.
312
 
In sum, the U.S. does not have to compete in a race to the bottom.  
On the contrary, if the U.S. enacted a national film incentive based on the 
New York and California models, it could bring a swift end to the costly 
race among not only the other states, but also across the planet.  It is time to 
end the madness. 
The end of state tax credits, which are based on artificial economic 
arguments, will not only end the maddening economic race to the bottom, 
but it will also help restore the creative side of the equation when deciding 
where to film.  Many writers, directors, actors, and others in the film and 
television production industry recognize that runaway productions 
motivated primarily, if not exclusively, for economic reasons are not the 
most effective way to enhance the creative and artistic aspects upon which 
the industry is driven.  Fostering this notion is critical within the film and 
television community and, according to Massimo Martinotti, founder and 
president of Mia Films, should be seen as a “quest for excellence”:
313
 
In the last few years when we mentioned the possibility of 
shooting abroad, we all immediately characterized this option as 
“runaway production.”  Last year (2003), more than 20 percent 
of American production companies shoot days took place outside 
the U.S., and it is true that the most frequent reason to go and 
shoot somewhere else has been costs.  Political and economic 
circumstances have given strong advantages to countries around 
the globe that can offer very low production costs and, at the 
same time, decent—and often excellent—structures, crew and 
equipment. 
However, I believe that we should consider the international 
approach of a production from the creative angle, and not only 
from the ‘saving money’ perspective.  In the last several years, I 
shot in more than 30 countries on all the continents, and I am 
sure that in most of cases, the creative impact of the international 
choice was stronger than the budgetary one. 
A location is like a good wine:  it has a specific color, a 
unique taste, a peculiar smell.  If these elements can make the 
idea grow, this is not “runaway,” it is the search for the best, the 
 
 312. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE FOR MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION DEV., REPORT ON THE 
EMPIRE STATE FILM PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 24 (2010). 
 313. Massimo Martinotti, Runaway Production or Quest for Excellence?, SHOOT, Jul. 5, 
2004, at 4. 
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fight for excellence.  Our business is based on these concepts.  
Some time ago, we were working on a project.  The agency was 
looking for a European atmosphere, a classical and elegant look, 
and a nostalgic mood.  The example proposed was Paris.  
Nevertheless, we suggested a different place:  Lisbon, Portugal.  I 
don’t think that any other European city can offer the same 
feeling:  the terraces of Alfama, the climbing streets of Barrio 
Alto, the stones, the tiles, the flowers, the walls.  Everything 
evokes old times, elegance and romanticism.  It is not the 
glamorous, sexy look of Paris, the imperial elegance of Vienna, 
the flamboyant and charming sensuality of Rome, the mysterious 
solidity of Prague or the contagious happiness of Seville.  It is the 
dreamy grace of Eisbon [sic], defined by the Fadomusic, the 
smell of the carnations, the blue color of its tiles, the flavor of an 
old wine from Porto. . . . 
The need for the perfect location goes much further than the 
quest for a specific type of geographic environment or an 
appropriate climate.  It is a much more delicate, subliminal and 
creative approach.  We shouldn’t look, for instance, for an 
“ancient European city” because thousands of places fit that 
description:  Pompeii, Bath, Tour, Koblenz, Sigüenza, Budapest, 
Istanbul, Olympia, etc.  We should, on the contrary, concentrate 
our quest on finding that unique atmosphere, texture, tone of 
color, type of light or shape that can make the commercial 
different, memorable, relevant. 
Instead of exploring new territories, very often we are moved 
to go back repeatedly to the same places:  if we go to Italy, we 
shoot in Tuscany, and in France, the spot is La Côte d’Azur.  
Why not Piedmont, Liguria or Trentino?  Why not the Loire 
region, Provence or Alsace?  Why not Spain, Belgium or 
Luxembourg instead? Why not Costa Rica, which I believe is the 
best-kept secret in Latin America as a production destination? 
Putting the location exclusively on the creative side of the 
equation will indeed give a more consistent meaning to the 
international approach of a production.  The quest for excellence 
is in this sense the antithesis of the runaway production 
concept.
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Here’s to the “quest for excellence!” 
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